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PRESERVING FAIRNESS IN TAX ADMINISTRATION
IN THE MA YO ERA
Steve R. Johnson*
One of the dominant themes in contemporary federal taxation is
bringing tax administration within the fold of general administrative law. In
2011, the United States Supreme Court unambiguously embraced this
movement in the landmark case Mayo Foundation for Medical Education &
Research v. United States, in which the Court held that challenges to the
validity of Treasury regulations generally are governed by the Chevron
standard to the same extent as are regulations issued by other administrative
agencies.
There was an immediate and strong hostile reaction to Mayo in tax
circles. Many fear that Mayo dramatically tips the balance in favor of the
Internal Revenue Service (Service), such that challenging allegedly invalid
tax regulations will be very difficult in the future. This article maintains
that, just on its own terms, Mayo is unlikely to have this effect.
But the world into which Mayo has thrust tax administration is
populated by other denizens. Mayo, safe in itself, may become dangerous
when combined with them. Specifically, Mayo may pose the peril of
governmental overreaching when Treasury and the Service use that case in
conjunction with the Brand X holding allowing regulations to supersede
prior judicial statutory construction, or with the Auer rule according
agencies great deference in interpreting their own regulations, or with
statutory rules allowing Treasury to issue regulations with retroactive
effect, or with possible application of Chevron to Service guidance
documents below the level of regulations.
This article assesses the practical significance of such threats, and it
University Professor of Law, Florida State University College of Law.
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2012 meetings of the American Tax Policy Institute in Washington, DC, and the Virginia
Tax Study Group at the University of Virginia School of Law for their contributions to this
article. I also thank my colleagues Joseph Dodge, Jeffrey Kahn, and Mark Seidenfeld for
their comments.
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suggests ways by which they may be defused. These ways entail the core
notion of delegation, which is the basis of administrative deference
doctrines. They also entail substantive, procedural, and constructional
arguments by which government overreaching through tax regulations may
be curbed. Such arguments sometimes are within existing doctrine; other
times they will require modest and salutary doctrinal adjustment. On the
basis of these approaches, the benefits of Mayo can be preserved without
the blight of regulatory unfairness.
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. INTRODUCTION
In its impact on our lives, the tax law is the single greatest medium of
interface between our government and our citizens. As the Supreme Court
has recognized, "[n]o other branch of the law touches human activities at so
many points."'I
Despite the length and complexity of the statutory tax law, the variety
of economic and social transactions is such that numerous important
matters are addressed only generally or not at all by the statutes. At the
federal level, the gaps are filled by tax regulations promulgated by the
Department of the Treasury and sub-regulation guidance issued by the
Internal Revenue Service (Service). Valid Treasury regulations have the
IDobson v. Commissioner, 320 U.S. 489, 494-95 (1943). Of course, the length and
complexity of the Internal Revenue Code (the "Code") and thus its impact on our affairs has
only grown since Dobson was handed down.
2 For a description of Treasury regulations and lower-level Internal Revenue Service
(Service) guidance, see DAVID M. RICHARDSON, JEROME BORISON & STEVE JOHNSON, CIVIL
Virginia Tax Review
force of law3 and are second in importance only to the Internal Revenue
Code (Code) itself.4 Thus, the standards by which the validity of tax
regulations is assessed are of critical significance to tax administration in
the United States.
In January 2011, the Supreme Court decided a landmark case in this
area: Mayo Foundation for Medical Education & Research v. United
States.5 Speaking of Mayo, the chief of the appellate section of the
Department of Justice Tax Division stated: "There has been a sea change in
administrative law, and certainly tax has been part of it."6 Like most
important cases, Mayo clarified some significant issues but left others
unresolved.
The reaction to Mayo from the community of taxpayers and their
representatives has been decidedly negative.7 The most important aspect of
this reaction has been the fear that Mayo radically tilts the "playing field" in
favor of the Service, making it difficult, if not impossible, for taxpayers to
effectively challenge Treasury regulations in many cases.
This article evaluates that concern. It concludes that, on its own terms
alone, Mayo is not particularly dangerous and, indeed, is desirable in
several major respects. However, the article also concludes that, when
Mayo is combined with other principles of administrative law, the potential
for overreaching by the Service exists. The article offers specific
suggestions - both arguments available to taxpayers and doctrinal
alterations available to the courts - by which this potential can be
TAX PROCEDURE 17 31 (2d ed. 2008).
SE.g., Helvering v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 306 U.S. 110, 115 (1939); Boulez v.
Commissioner, 810 F.2d 209, 212 (D.C. Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 896 (1987);
Union Elec. Co. v. United States, 305 F.2d 850, 854 (Ct. Cl. 1962).
4 For a description of the process by which tax regulations are drafted, reviewed, and
issued, see Treas. Reg. § 601.601(a)-(c) (as amended in 1987); Mitchell Rogovin & Donald
L. Korb, The Four R's Revisited: Regulations, Rulings, Reliance and Retroactivity in the 21'
Century: A View from Within, TAXES, Aug. 2009, at 21; Paul F. Schmid, The Tax
Regulations Making Process- Then and Now, 24 TAx LAW. 541 (1971).
5 Mayo Found. for Med. Educ. & Research v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 704 (2011).
6 Jeremiah Coder, IRS Official Explains, Defends Rulemaking Process, 134 TAX
NOTES 1229, 1229 (Mar. 5, 2012) (quoting Gilbert Rothenberg).
7 The commentary, favorable as well as critical, includes Jeremiah Coder, Mayo's
Unanswered Questions, 130 TAX NOTES 1118 (Mar. 7, 2011); Bruce Givner & Ken Barish,
Challenging IRS Regulations: The Supreme Court's Mayo Decision, TAX PRAC. & PROC.,
Feb.-Mar. 2011, at 25; Leandra Lederman & Stephen Mazza, More Mayo Please?
Temporary Regulations After Mayo Foundation v. United States, 31 ABA SECTION OF TAX'N
NEWS QUARTERLY 15 (2011); Richard M. Lipton & Russell R. Young, Mayo Foundation,
Treasury Regulations, and the "Death" of National Muffler, 114 J. TAX'N 206 (2011);
David J. Shakow, Who's Afraid of the APA?, 134 TAX NOTES 825 (Feb. 13, 2012); Patrick J.
Smith, Life After Mayo: Silver Linings, 131 TAX NOTES 1251 (Jun. 20, 2011).
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mitigated. Taking these possibilities into account, the article predicts that,
over time, it will be recognized that Mayo (properly argued in future cases)
will increase, not decrease, the chances that taxpayers can successfully
attack unwholesome exercises of tax rulemaking by the Treasury and the
Service.
The article has seven parts. Part II is foundational. It describes the
context, facts, and holdings of Mayo.
Part III explains the two great benefits produced by the Mayo decision.
First, there has been a parochialism about tax practice. Tax practitioners
have often thought of tax as an island upon whose shores the waves of
general administrative law do not wash. Mayo firmly dispels such
insularity. It does so narrowly by establishing that the proper standard for
evaluating the validity of tax regulations is provided by the general
administrative law Chevron decision9 rather than by the pre-Chevron, tax-
specific National Muffler case.10 Mayo also does so more broadly by
providing that the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) and other sources
of general administrative law apply as surely to tax as they do to other
regulatory areas. Second, Mayo contributes to a welcome trend in the case
law to mitigate some of the objectionable aspects of Chevron.
Part IV begins the discussion of the possibility of governmental
overreaching in tax rulemaking. It shows that, on its own terms, Mayo does
not materially shift the prospects of success in litigation involving
challenges to tax regulations. Thus, simply at this level, the risks of Mayo
pale in comparison to its benefits.
Part V, however, takes a wider angle of vision. It considers Mayo not in
isolation but in conjunction with other principles of administrative and tax
law. These other principles include (1) the Brand X rule under which
agency rulemaking can trump previous judicial decisions construing
statutes,12 (2) the Auer principle under which courts accord great deference
to agencies' interpretations of their own regulations,13 (3) the ability of the
Treasury under section 7805(b), in certain circumstances, to issue
regulations with retroactive effect and (4) possible application of Chevron
to Service positions lower in dignity and effect than Treasury regulations.
8 See, e.g., Jeremiah Coder, Tax Law's Vanity Mirror Shattered, 131 TAX NOTEs 35
(Jan. 2, 2012); Roger Dorsey, Mayo and the End of "Tax Exceptionalism" in Judicial
Deference, 87 PRAc. TAX STRATEGIES 63 (2011).
9 Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
10 Nat'l Muffler Dealers Ass'n v. United States, 440 U.S. 472 (1979).
11 Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-59 (2012).
12 Nat'l Cable & Telecomms. Ass'n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967 (2005).
13 Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452 (1997); Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co., 325
U.S. 410, 413-14 (1945).
2732012]
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If the government combines these principles and rules in an aggressive
fashion, it could short-circuit appropriate procedural safeguards and achieve
substantively undesirable outcomes. Although I have high regard for the
fairness and sensitivity with which Treasury and the Service typically
administer the tax law, the potential for governmental overreaching
demands attention and containment.
Part VI develops means by which such containment can be effected. It
explores four categories of limiting principles based on delegation,
procedure, substance, and interpretation concepts. Part VI notes several
particular cabining principles under each of these categories. The assertion
of such principles by taxpayers, and their acceptance by the courts, will go
far to preserve the benefits of Mayo while controlling the potential for
governmental overreaching that could arise from the combination of Mayo
and other rules. Part VII concludes.
II. MAYO
Taxes imposed under the Federal Insurance Contributions Act
("FICA") fund the Social Security system. FICA taxes are imposed on
wages,14 but excluded from tax are amounts paid for "service performed in
the employ of. .. a school, college, or university . .. if such service is
performed by a student who is enrolled and regularly attending classes at
such school, college, or university." 5
The Mayo Foundation and the University of Minnesota have residency
programs that train doctors. The programs are of mixed character. Those
enrolled in them receive education, but they also render substantial services
for which they receive substantial compensation.
The issue in Mayo was whether the medical residents in these programs
are students within the meaning of the FICA exception described above.
Under a Treasury regulation promulgated in 1951, eligibility for the
exception was determined on a case-by-case basis.16 In December 2004,
Treasury amended the regulation to provide prospectively that the exception
applies only when the educational component predominates over the service
component. The amended regulation also provides categorically that
scheduled work of over 40 hours per week disqualifies a person from the
exception.' 7 The Mayo medical residents' schedules and the University
medical residents' schedules typically far exceed this limit.
14 I.R.C. §§ 3101(a), 3111(a).
1 I.R.C. § 3121(b)(10)(A)-(B).
16 Treas. Reg. § 31.3121(b)(10)-2(d) (1960); Rev. Rul. 78-17, 1978-1 C.B. 307.
Treas. Reg. § 31.3121 (b)(1 0)-2(d)(3)(iii) (1960).
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Mayo and the University challenged the validity of the amended
regulation. The district court held for the challengers. The circuit court
reversed.19 In an opinion by Chief Justice Roberts, the Supreme Court
unanimously affirmed the circuit court. The Court held that Chevron
provided the controlling standard. Applying the famous Chevron two-
step,21 the Court further held that the amended regulation survived step one
because the statute is silent or ambiguous as to the content of the student
exception22 and that it survived step two because it reasonably interprets the
statute.23
II. BENEFITS OF MA YO
Mayo makes salutary contributions to tax administration. Two of the
benefits are of principal significance. First, Mayo integrates tax law into the
broader fabric of administrative law. It does so both narrowly (by
establishing the primacy of Chevron as the standard governing attacks on
tax regulations) and broadly (by holding the APA and other administrative
law rules applicable in tax). Second, Mayo furthers a developing trend in
the law to ameliorate some of the problems with Chevron.
A. Mayo and the Attack on Tax Exceptionalism
1. Narrow Aspect
The validity or weight of tax regulations and sub-regulation guidance
had been tested numerous times over scores of years before Chevron was
handed down in 1984.24 In Mayo, the taxpayer argued that National
8 Mayo Found. For Med. Educ. & Research v. United States, 503 F. Supp. 2d 1154
(D. Minn. 2007), rev'd, 131 S. Ct. 704 (2011), aff'g 568 F.3d 675 (8th Cir. 2009).
19 Mayo Found. For Med. Educ. & Research v. United States, 568 F.3d 675 (8th Cir.
2009), aff'd, 131 S. Ct. 704 (2011).
2o Mayo Found. for Med. Educ. & Research v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 704, 712-14
(2011).
21 See Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-43
(1984).
22 131 S. Ct. at 711.
23 Id. at716.
24 The result of these cases was considerable, but not unlimited, deference to Treasury
regulations:
"There is a strong presumption in favor of the validity of Treasury regulations. A
challenger to a Treasury regulation will prevail, however, if he establishes that a regulation is
unreasonable or plainly inconsistent with the Code itself. It is thus apparent that the
deference paid to Treasury regulations is not boundless."
Goodson-Todman Enters., Ltd. v. Commissioner, 784 F.2d 66, 74 (2d Cir. 1986) (citations
2012] 275
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Muffler, the most frequently cited case of the tax-specific pre-Chevron line,
should provide the standard for assessing the validity of the regulation at
issue. Central to the dispute as to standards was the fact that the regulation
at issue in Mayo is a general authority, not specific authority, regulation.
Congress has conferred rulemaking authority to Treasury and the
Service in two principal ways: specific authority and general authority
delegations.25 Specific authority delegations appear in hundreds of sections
of the Internal Revenue Code,26 in subsections or paragraphs which, with
varying language, direct or authorize Treasury to promulgate regulations to
implement the section at hand.27 In contrast, general authority regulations
derive from Code section 7805(a), which allows Treasury to issue
regulations "needful . .. for the enforcement of' the Code.
It was widely agreed even before Mayo that Chevron provides the
standard when a taxpayer challenges a specific authority regulation.28
However, courts29 and commentators disagreed as to whether Chevron or
the National Muffler line of cases governed attacks on the validity of
general authority regulations. The Supreme Court itself was responsible for
much of the confusion, sometimes citing Chevron and other times citing
National Muffler without explaining why one case and not the other was
being cited. Some older cases stated that general authority regulations are
omitted); see also United States v. Cartwright, 411 U.S. 546, 550 (1973) (noting deference
paid to tax regulations but adding: "But that principle is to set the framework for judicial
analysis; it does not displace it.").
25 In addition to Treasury regulations, there are a number of internal procedural
regulations of the Service. They describe how Service functions are performed and address
the respective roles of taxpayers and Service personnel in various administrative processes.
These procedural regulations are issued by the Service without the necessity of Treasury
approval. Treas. Reg. §§ 601.101-601.901 (1996).
26 Different observers have come up with different tallies. E.g., N.Y.S. Bar Ass'n Tax
Section, Report on Legislative Grants of Regulatory Authority, 2006 TNT 215-22 (Nov. 3,
2006) (stating that there are approximately 550 specific authority delegations in the Code).
27 E.g., I.R.C. §§ 385(a), 469(l), 1502.
28 E.g., Carlos v. Commissioner, 123 T.C. 275, 280 (2004); Square D. Co. &
Subsidiaries v. Commissioner, 118 T.C. 299, 307 (2002), aff'd, 438 F.3d 739 (7th Cir. 2006).
29 E.g., Swallows Holding, Ltd. v. Commissioner, 126 T.C. 96, 97 (2006) (applying
National Muffler), rev'd, 515 F.3d 162, 169-70 (3d Cir. 2008) (applying Chevron).
30 Compare John F. Coverdale, Court Review of Tax Regulations and Revenue Rulings
in the Chevron Era, 64 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 35 (1995) (arguing against application of
Chevron), with Steve R. Johnson, Swallows as it Might Have Been: Regulations Revising
Case Law, 112 TAX NOTES 773 (Aug. 28, 2006) (arguing for application of Chevron).
3 Compare United States v. Cleveland Indians Baseball Co., 532 U.S. 200, 219
(2001), and Cottage Say. Ass'n v. Commissioner, 499 U.S. 554, 560-61 (1991) (both citing
National Muffler), with Atil. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Commissioner, 523 U.S. 382, 387 (1998), and
United States v. Boyle, 469 U.S. 241, 246 n.4 (1985) (both citing Chevron).
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entitled to less deference than specific authority regulations,32 but the truth
of that has been questioned.33
In Mayo and other cases, taxpayers pressed the following language
from National Muffler:
A regulation may have particular force if (1) it is a substantially
contemporaneous construction of the statute by those presumed to
have been aware of congressional intent. If the regulation dates
from a later period, (2) the manner in which it evolved merits
inquiry. Other relevant considerations are (3) the length of time the
regulation has been in effect, (4) the reliance placed on it, (5) the
consistency of the Commissioner's interpretation, and (6) the
degree of scrutiny Congress has devoted to the regulation during
subsequent re-enactments of the statute.34
Taxpayers argued that, in the given case, one or more of the six factors was
absent, and thus that the regulation was not entitled to deference.35
In significant part, Mayo resolved the clash as to the governing
standard. It makes clear that Chevron controls as to general authority, as
well as specific authority, regulations, especially when the regulation has
gone through the APA notice-and-comment procedure, as the regulation
at issue in Mayo had.37
Moreover, Mayo disregarded a number of the considerations listed in
National Muffler. Specifically,
* "We have repeatedly held that '[a]gency inconsistency is not a
basis for declining to analyze the agency's interpretation under
the Chevron framework.' 38
32 E.g., United States v. Vogel Fertilizer Co., 455 U.S. 16, 24 (1982); Rowan Cos. v.
United States, 452 U.S. 247, 253 (1981).
33 E.g., BORIS I. BITTKER, MARTIN J. MCMAHON, JR. & LAWRENCE A. ZELENAK,
FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF INDIVIDUALS 46-5 (3d ed. 2002); Johnson, supra note 30, at
780-81.
3 Nat'I Muffler Dealers Ass'n v. United States, 440 U.S. 472, 477 (1979) (numbers
added).
35 For example, the Mayo taxpayer argued that the regulation was not a substantially
contemporaneous construction of the statute, that it emerged from a course of litigation, and
that there had been little reliance on the regulation. Mayo Found. For Med. Educ. &
Research v. United States, 503 F. Supp. 2d 1154, 1176 (D. Minn. 2007), rev'd, 131 S. Ct.
704 (2011), aff'g 568 F.3d 675 (8th Cir. 2009).
36 See 5 U.S.C. § 553 (2012).
3 Mayo Found. for Med. Educ. & Research v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 704, 714
(2011).
3 Id. at 712 (quoting Nat'l Cable & Telecomms. Ass'n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545
2772012]
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* "We have instructed that 'neither antiquity nor contemporaneity
with [a] statute is a condition of [a regulation's] validity."' 3 9
* "We have found it immaterial to our analysis that a 'regulation
was prompted by litigation."'40 This makes sense. Numerous
tax questions eventually are litigated, and Treasury or the
Service will be parties to all of those cases. Thus, denying
validity to regulations issued in expectation of litigation would
render most, if not all, regulations suspect.41
The language of Mayo could fairly be read as entirely overthrowing
National Muffler,4 2 but doing so would be slightly undesirable because
National Muffler and the line of cases of which it was a part reached
sensible results based on sensible criteria,43 Wholesale overthrow also
would be unnecessary. As shown in part IV.A below, National Muffler, like
Chevron, is a deferential precedent."
2. Broad Aspect
The second main thrust of Mayo is broader and will ultimately be more
significant. In reaching its conclusions about general authority versus
specific authority tax regulations and Chevron versus National Muffler, the
Mayo Court cited five cases - all of them non-tax cases.45
U.S. 967, 981 (2005) and citing United States v. Eurodif S.A., 555 U.S. 305, 316 (2009))
(punctuation omitted).Indeed, the regulation in Chevron was upheld despite the agency
having changed its previous position. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council,
Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 857-58 (1984).
39 Mayo, 131 S. Ct. at 712 (quoting Smiley v. Citibank (S.D.) N.A., 517 U.S. 735, 740
(1996)) (punctuation omitted).The regulation at issue in Chevron was not roughly
contemporaneous with the statute. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 851-58.
40 Mayo, 131 S. Ct. at 712 (quoting Smiley, 517 U.S. at 741, and citing United
Dominion Ind. Inc. v. United States, 532 U.S. 822, 838 (2001)) (punctuation omitted).For
detailed exploration of this matter, see Leandra Lederman, The Fight over "Fighting Regs"
and Judicial Deference in Tax Litigation, 92 B.U. L. REV. 643 (2012).
41 See Indianapolis Life Ins. Co. v. United States, 115 F.3d 430, 436 (7th Cir. 1997).
42 See Mayo, 131 S. Ct. at 712-14.
43 E.g., Nat'I Muffler Dealers Ass'n v. United States, 440 U.S. 472, 477 (stating that
the ultimate question is "whether the regulation harmonizes with the plain language of the
statute, its origin, and its purpose.").
4 The Mayo Court accepted the taxpayers' contention that National Muffler is less
deferential than Chevron. Mayo, 131 S. Ct. at 713.As shown in part IV.A infra, this view is
incorrect.
45 Mayo, 131 S. Ct. at 713-14 (citing Chevron, Long Island Care at Home, Ltd. v.
Coke, 551 U.S. 158 (2007), Nat'l Cable &Telecomms. Ass'n v. Brand X Intemet Servs., 545
U.S. 967, 981 (2005), United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218 (2001), and Sullivan v.
Everhart, 494 U.S. 83 (1990)).
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Inference is unneeded here, however, as the Court made explicit the
equivalent treatment of tax and non-tax regulations:
Mayo has not advanced any justification for applying a less
deferential standard of review to Treasury Department regulations
than we apply to the rules of any other agency. In the absence of
such justification, we are not inclined to carve out an approach to
administrative review good for tax law only. To the contrary, we
have expressly recognized the importance of maintaining a
uniform approach to judicial review of administrative action.
With these words, the Mayo Court disposed of tax exceptionalism, the
notion that tax administration is exempt from the rules governing other
areas of regulation.47 Similarly, a few months after Mayo was handed
down, the D.C. Circuit stated: "The IRS is not special in this regard; no
exception exists shielding it - unlike the rest of the Federal government -
from suit under the APA."48 Other courts have followed suit. 49
Precisely how far we can go in this direction remains to be seen. In one
respect, taxation is different from and more important than any other single
federal activity.50 Revenue is the sine qua non for all other governmental
activities. The modern welfare and regulatory state could not exist without a
robust tax system.51
This revenue imperative has resulted in several features of tax
46 Mayo, 131 S. Ct. 713 (punctuation omitted).Fittingly, Mayo quoted one case and
cited one more as support, both non-tax cases. Dickinson v. Zurko, 527 U.S. 150, 154
(1999); Skinner v. Mid-Am. Pipeline Co., 490 U.S. 212 (1989).
47 For arguments against tax exceptionalism, see Paul L. Caron, Tax Myopia, or
Mamas Don't Let Your Babies Grow up to Be Tax Lawyers, 13 VA. TAx REV.517 (1994);
Kristin E. Hickman, The Need for Mead: Rejecting Tax Exceptionalism in Judicial
Deference, 90 MiNN. L. REv. 1537 (2006); Steve R. Johnson, Intermountain and the
Importance ofAdministrative Law in Tax Law, 128 TAx NOTES 837 (Aug. 23, 2010); Rimma
Tsvasman, Note, No More Excuses: A Case for the IRS's Full Compliance with the
Administrative Procedure Act, 76 BROOK. L. REv. 837 (2011).
48 Cohen v. United States, 650 F.3d 717, 723 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (en banc) (applying
APA waiver of sovereign immunity and presumption of judicial reviewability).For
discussion of Cohen, see Steve R. Johnson, Cohen: Hard Case Makes (Semi) Bad Law, ABA
SEC. TAX'N NEWS Q., Fall 2011, at 12.
49 E.g., Koprowski v. Commissioner, 138 T.C. 5,9 (2012) (Holmes, J., concurring).
5o See, e.g., United States v. Kimbell Foods, Inc., 440 U.S. 715, 734 (1979) ("That
collection of taxes is vital to the functioning, indeed existence, of government cannot be
denied.").
5 Generations ago, the Supreme Court declared: "taxes are the lifeblood of
government, and their prompt and certain availability an imperious need." Bull v. United
States, 295 U.S. 247, 259 (1935).
2012] 279
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administration that uniquely advantage the Service. For example, (1) the
Service's administrative summons is an unusually powerful information-
gathering device, subject to only weak limitations;52 (2) the Service's tools
for collecting tax debts far exceed in power debt collection options
available to private creditors;5 3 and (3) the Anti-Injunction Act and the
Declaratory Judgment Act typically bar taxpayer efforts to sue to forestall
Service actions prior to commencement of collection activity. 54
Such differences, however, do not diminish the significance of Mayo in
this regard. The movement against tax exceptionalism does not demand that
tax and all other areas be made to fit a Procrustean bed. It requires only that
differences between tax and other areas be created for good reason by
Congress, rather than stemming from judicial decree or parochial insularity.
Mayo is right to insist on the greatest degree of congressionally
permitted administrative uniformity between tax and other regulatory areas.
Treasury and the Service are agencies within the meaning of, and thus
subject to the requirements of, the APA.55 The APA and other sources of
administrative law have made occasional appearances in tax case law and
commentary57 for decades, but the tax bar has been slow to weave these
strands together. Under the impetus of Mayo, we may hope - and
reasonably expect - that this belated mom will dawn.
B. Mayo and Chevron
Chevron is a heavily criticized doctrine. In my view, the criticism is
appropriate. The Chevron opinion was flawed to start with, and its flaws
have been compounded by subsequent developments. Fortunately, there
52 See, e.g., Bryan T. Camp, Tax Administration as Inquisitorial Process and the
Partial Paradigm Shift in the IRS Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998, 56 FLA. L. REV. I
(2004).
5 See, e.g., United States v. Rodgers, 461 U.S. 677, 697 (1983); Steve R. Johnson, The
IRS as Super Creditor, 92 TAX NOTES 655, 655 (July 30, 2001).
5 I.R.C. § 7421; 28 U.S.C. § 2201 (2012).These statutes have reared their heads
recently as potential obstacles to judicial review of the constitutionality of the individual
mandate and shared responsibility payment components of the Patient Protection and
Affordable Care Act of 2010 (so-called Obamacare). See Steve R. Johnson, Anti-Injunction
Act and the Individual Mandate, 133 TAX NOTES 1395 (Dec. 12, 2011).
5 Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 551(1) (2012).
56 E.g., Am. Standard Inc. v. Commissioner, 602 F.2d 256 (Ct. Cl. 1979) (applying the
APA notice-and-comment requirements to a tax regulation); Wing v. Commissioner, 81 T.C.
17(1983).
57 E.g., Michael Asimow, Public Participation in the Adoption of Temporary Tax
Regulations, 44 TAX LAw. 343 (1991); Schuyler M. Moore, New Regulations Violate
Regulatory Flexibility Act and Executive Order 12291, 36 TAX NOTES 805 (Aug. 3, 1987).
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appears to be a move afoot to downplay Chevron, not in name but in fact.
Mayo contributes to that trend.
1. Problems with Chevron
Chevron is the most cited case in administrative law and perhaps in
American law generally. Yet, it is an accidental doctrine; the Supreme
Court did not appreciate that Chevron would become a landmark case.
Discontent with Chevron has been building, and both tax and non-tax
scholars have called for its abrogation. 60 The criticisms are both empirical
and normative, including the following. First, Chevron has proved highly
unpredictable, both as to when it will be applied and what results it will
produce when applied.62 Subsequent cases have contributed to the
muddle.6 3
Second, many have complained that Chevron lacks an adequate
theoretical foundation.64 For example, a key aspect of Chevron is the notion
8 See, e.g., STEPHEN G. BREYER ET AL., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND REGULATORY
POLIcY 247 (6th ed. 2006).
Thomas W. Merrill, The Story of Chevron: The Making of an Accidental Landmark,
in ADMINISTRATIVE LAW STORIES 398 (Peter L. Strauss ed., 2006).
60 E.g., Jack M. Beerman, End the Failed Chevron Experiment Now: How Chevron
Has Failed and Why It Can and Should Be Overruled, 42 CONN. L. REv. 779 (2010); Bryan
T. Camp, Interpreting Statutory Silence, 128 TAX NOTES 501, 507 (Aug. 2, 201 0).Professor
Beerman's article was cited in a dissenting opinion in a much-discussed recent tax case.
Mannella v. Commissioner, 631 F.3d 115, 130 n. 14 (3d Cir. 2011) (Ambro, J., dissenting).
61 E.g., Ann Graham, Searching for Chevron in Muddy Watters: The Roberts Court
and Judicial Review of Agency Regulations, 60 ADMIN. L. REV. 229 (2008); David M.
Hasen, The Ambiguous Basis ofJudicial Deference to Administrative Rules, 17 YALE J. ON
REG.327 (2000); Linda Jellum, Chevron's Demise: A Survey of Chevron from Infancy to
Senescence, 59 ADMIN. L. REV. 725 (2007); Note, Justifying the Chevron Doctrine: Insights
from the Rule ofLenity, 123 HARv. L. REv. 2043 (2010).
62 E.g., Coeur Alaska, Inc. v. Southeast Alaska Conservation Council, 557 U.S. 261,
295 (2009) (Scalia, J., concurring) (citing cases applying Chevron but reaching inconsistent
results).
63 The Court clarified or modified Chevron in United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S.
218 (2001). Mead has been called an "inscrutable opinion... whose incomprehensible
criteria for Chevron deference have produced so much confusion in the lower courts." Coeur
Alaska, Inc. v. Southeast Alaska Conservation Council, 557 U.S. 261, 295 (2009) (Scalia, J.,
concurring).
6 E.g., William R. Anderson, Against Chevron: A Modest Proposal, 56 ADMIN. L.
REV. 957 (2004); Lisa Schultz Bressman, Chevron's Mistake, 58 DUKE L.J. 549 (2009); John
E. Duffy, Administrative Common Law in Judicial Review, 77 TEx. L. REV. 113, 189-211
(1998); Elizabeth V. Foote, Statutory Interpretation or Public Administration: How Chevron
Misconceives the Function ofAgencies and Why It Matters, 569ADMIN. L. REv. 673 (2007).
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that Congress intended the relevant agency to fill in gaps in the statute.6 5
Yet "[s]everal important commentators have serious doubts that there is any
evidence to support the cornerstone of Chevron deference for gaps."6 6
Third, the very term "Chevron deference" breeds confusion and
analytical imprecision.6 "Deference" is a decidedly bad word choice
because it elides two fundamentally different operations.
One sense in which deference has been used in the Chevron context
refers to the validity of a regulation or other rule. Thus "to accord Chevron
deference" is sometimes used to mean "to hold that the regulation or other
rule is valid and legally enforceable."
But this is strange. A court does not "defer" to the Constitution or a
statute. Such measures are binding law. Judges apply binding law; they do
not defer to it. Similarly, a valid substantive or legislative regulation has
"force of law" effect. Thus, when a court applies Chevron in this context,
the question is whether the regulation is valid and thus binding on the court,
not whether the court will "defer" to the regulation.69
The other sense in which deference is used refers to nonbinding
administrative positions, including interpretive regulations.70 Here, it is
linguistically possible to speak of deference. A court must follow a valid
substantive regulation; it may choose to be influenced by a lower-level
65 Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843-44
(1984) (quoting Morton v. Ruiz, 415 U.S. 199, 231 (1974)).
6 Irving Salem, Mayo Dissected: Some Dragons Slain, Some Still Breathing Fire, 130
TAX NOTES 1327, 1332 (Mar. 14, 2011) (citing Elizabeth Garrett, Legislating Chevron, 101
MICH. L. REv. 2637, 2638 (2003) and Cynthia R. Farina, Statutory Interpretation and the
Balance of Power in the Administrative State, 89 COLUM. L. REv. 452, 468-78
(1989)).Indeed, Chevron seems to turn delegation on its head. Originally, delegation doctrine
looked to an affirmative conferral of authority by Congress upon the agency. Chevron,
however, is satisfied to presume delegation from statutory silence.
6 Cf Robert A. Anthony, The Supreme Court and the APA: Sometimes They Just
Don't Get It, 1OADMIN. L.J. AM. U. 1, 2 (1996) ("[T]he Court befogs APA concepts by
sloppy and bloated opinions, which leave confusion in their wake. The Court's most hurtful
sin is its pervasive imprecision.").
68 E.g., Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281, 295 (1979); Am. Mining Cong. v.
Mine Safety & Health Admin., 995 F.2d 1106, 1109 (D.C. Cir. 1993).Although widely used,
"force of law" is a concept of limited clarity. See, e.g. Sidney A. Shapiro & Richard W.
Murphy, Eight Things Americans Can't Figure Out About Controlling Administrative Law,
61ADMIN, L. REV. 5 (2009).
69 See, e.g., Michael Herz, Deference Running Riot: Separating Interpretation and
Lawmaking Under Chevron, 6ADMIN. L.J. AM. U. 187 (1992); Robert A. Anthony, Which
Agency Interpretations Should Bind Citizens and the Courts?, 7 YALE J. ON REG. 1 (1990).
7o See 5 U.S.C. § 553(b) (2012) (providing that regulations which are merely
interpretative and so lack the force of law need not go through the notice-and-comment
process).
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administrative position. Nonetheless, it would be doctrinally "cleaner" to
confine Chevron to the first (binding) sense of deference, leaving this
second (merely influential) sense to the Skidmore/Mead standard.7 1
Fourth, the Chevron standard raises a substantial issue of legitimacy.
Since enactment of the APA in 1946, we have had statutory rules as to the
standards courts should apply when reviewing agency actions, including the
rule that courts should set aside such actions when they are "arbitrary" or
"capricious."72 Courts should not use common law making to displace
statutes.7 3 Thus, if Chevron created a new standard of review, 7 4 the decision
is of dubious legitimacy.
2. Options
Faced with the serious theoretical and practical problems of Chevron,
we have three options. They are (1) continue to try to muddle along, hoping
that these problems will somehow disappear or moderate, (2) expressly
overturn Chevron, or (3) continue to honor Chevron in name but apply it so
that, in substance, it is no longer an independently operative principle of
law. I believe that the third option is the most satisfactory choice.
Choosing the first option would be a triumph of wishful thinking. The
problems with Chevron described above are not mere annoyances or the
grousing of idle pedants. They are serious. Moreover, they show no signs of
ameliorating. There is no evidence that Chevron is on a path toward self-
correction.
The second option seems unlikely to occur. Judicial reversal of
Chevron could be effected only by the Supreme Court. The Court does
sometimes overturn its own precedents.75 However, the conservatism of the
Under Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 139-40 (1944), the weight accorded
to the agency's view depends on "the degree of the agency's care, its consistency, formality,
and relative expertness, and . .. the persuasiveness of the agency's position." United States
v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 228 (2001) (footnotes omitted) (interpreting Skidmore).
Skidmore, long thought moribund, was revived in Mead, 533 U.S. at 228.
72 5 U.S.C.A. § 706(2)(A) (2012).
n See, e.g., Steve R. Johnson, The Taxpayer's Duty of Consistency, 46 TAX L. REV.
537, 571-76 (1991).
74 It is doubtful that the Supreme Court intended the Chevron two-step procedure to be
a new rule independent of statutory standards. Indeed, although not citing the APA
expressly, Chevron traced the language of 5 U.S.C. § 706 when it stated that "legislative
regulations are given controlling weight unless they arc arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly
contrary to the statute." Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S.
837, 844 (1984).
75 See, e.g., William N. Eskridge, Jr., Overruling Statutory Precedents, 76 GEo. L.J.
1361 (1988) (identifying numerous cases in which the Supreme Court reversed one or
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judiciary makes express overruling the last, not the first, option. Absent
judicial action, Congress probably could overturn Chevron by legislation.76
However, there is no indication that Congress has an appetite to do so.
Thus, the third option seems the most feasible. Moreover, as shown by
the following section, there is evidence both (1) that Chevron is being
eroded in fact if not in name and (2) that Mayo furthers that movement.
3. Mayo's Effect on Chevron
Chevron has been eroded from two directions. First, it is now clear that
Chevron's domain is limited. Mead7 and other cases7 have made it clear
that Chevron does not always provide the standard by which challenges to
agency actions and positions are evaluated.
Second, when Chevron does apply, its two steps appear to be
collapsing into a single "reasonableness" inquiry based on the APA's
"arbitrary or capricious" standard. Chevron's first step - whether the
statute itself clearly answers the question at issue - never had any
outcome-determinative significance independent of Chevron's second step
- whether the agency's position reasonably interprets the statute.79 A
regulation contrary to a clear statute can never be reasonable. Thus, step
one will never invalidate a regulation that would not also be invalidated
under step two.
Therefore, all of Chevron boils down to step two, which increasingly is
being conflated with "arbitrary or capricious" interpreted as
"unreasonable." For example, in late 2011, the Supreme Court decided the
Judulang case. The Court unanimously invalidated an immigration
regulation, doing so under the APA "arbitrary or capricious" standard. The
government argued that Chevron's step two should have been applied
another of its statutory precedents).
76 There is some question whether the legislative branch has the constitutional
authority to dictate interpretational methods to the co-equal judicial branch. See, e.g., Steve
R. Johnson, Statutes Requiring "Plain Meaning" Interpretation,53 ST. TAX NOTES 763
(2009); Nicholas Quinn Rosenkranz, Federal Rules ofStatutory Interpretation, 115 HARv. L.
REv. 2085 (2002).However, that question probably would be resolved in favor of upholding
the validity of such a statute.
n See United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 220 (2001).
78 E.g., Tualatin Valley Builders Supply, Inc. v. United States, 522 F.3d 937, 941 (9th
Cir. 2008).
7 Chevron sometimes frames the second step as whether the agency's position
"reasonably" interprets the statute but includes other things such as whether it "permissibly"
interprets the statute - suggesting that these terms are functionally equivalent in this context.
Compare Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843 ("permissible") with id. at 844 ("reasonable").
80 See infra Part VI.C.1.
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instead. The Court replied: "Were we to do so, our analysis would be the
same." A number of lower court decisions are in the same vein.82
Mayo contributes to this movement. Mayo states that, under step two, a
court "may not disturb an agency rule unless it is 'arbitrary or capricious in
substance, or manifestly contrary to the statute."' 8 3 Thereafter, the Mayo
Court uses the words "reasonable," "sensible," and "rational" multiple
times to describe the inquiry.84 Such interchangeability implies equivalence
of meaning. Thus, "[b]ased on Mayo, it is probably no longer profitable to
argue that the arbitrary and reasonable tests differ."8 5
In short, under Mayo and other recent case law, the Chevron two-step
procedure appears to be receding as an independent rule of law. It is
collapsing into a reasonableness inquiry pursuant to the APA statutory
standard. In terms of legitimacy, this is a wholesome development.
IV. GOVERNMENTAL OVERREACHING-MAYO ALONE
Many commentators - especially attorneys and accountants who
represent taxpayers before the Service and in court - have voiced the
concern that Mayo puts a heavy thumb on the scale in favor of the Service
in cases involving regulations. That concern is built on the belief that
National Muffler was a more taxpayer-friendly standard than Chevron.8 7
Thus, the extension of Chevron to challenges to general authority
regulations has been viewed as inimical to taxpayers, particularly because
there are far more general authority than specific authority regulations.
Even were this perception as to National Muffler versus Chevron
81 Judulang v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 476, 483 n.7 (2011); see Irving Salem, Supreme
Court Clarifies Mayo; or Is It Something Bolder?, 2012 TNT 5-18 (Jan. 9, 2012) (discussing
Judulang).
82 E.g., GHS Health Maint. Org., Inc. v. United States, 536 F.3d 1293, 1297 (Fed. Cir.
2008); Dominion Res., Inc. v. United States, 97 Fed. Cl. 239, 253 (2011); Barahona v.
Napolitano, No. 10 Civ. 1574(SAS), 2011 WL 4840716, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 11, 2011).
83 Mayo Found, for Med. Educ. & Research v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 704, 711
(2011) (punctuation omitted) (quoting Household Credit Servs., Inc. v. Pfenning, 541 U.S.
232, 242 (2004), and Mead, 533 U.S. at 227).
84 Mayo,131 S. Ct. at 714-16.
85 Salem, supra note 66, at 1330.
86 Eg., KPMG, Mayo Foundation Cures Tax Myopia, WHAT'S NEWS IN TAX:
ANALYSIS THAT MATTERS FROM WASHINGTON NATIONAL TAX, Jan. 17, 2011, at 2; IRS
Administration, Mayo Decision Seen Increasing Regulatory Power, Making Court
Challenges Difficult, 30 TAX MGMT. WKLY. REP., Feb. 28, 2011, at 206; IRS Administration,
Mayo Ruling Raises Bar for Challenges to Tax Regulations, Practitioners Say, 30 TAX
MGMT. WKLY. REP., Feb. 21, 2011, at 217.
87 E.g., Lipton & Young, supra note 7, at 206.
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accurate, Mayo would not be a particularly inviting target. Even before
Mayo was handed down, the clear trend in the lower courts was in favor of
applying Chevron to challenges to general authority Treasury regulations.
Thus, the "Chevron governs" outcome likely was simply a matter of time,
with or without Mayo.
More significantly, the above perception is inaccurate. This is so for
three reasons developed below. First, properly understood, National Muffler
was a deferential precedent, not a pro-taxpayer precedent. Second,
application of Chevron does not guarantee victory for the government.
Third, taxpayers have prevailed in many of the lower court tax decisions
applying Mayo.
A. National Muffler Deferential
What Mayo properly rejected was not National Muffler rightly
understood, but the caricature of National Muffler offered by this and other
taxpayers. Seen properly, National Muffler is a pro-deference precedent, not
a factors-based anti-deference precedent.
First, context matters. National Muffler was not an isolated island but
part of an archipelago. National Muffler was part of a line of cases, and that
line was deferential in spirit.89
Second, National Muffler's result was pro-government. The case
upheld the challenged regulation even though it lacked contemporaneity,
one of the six listed considerations.90
Third, in the National Muffler opinion, the six listed considerations are
bracketed by deferential language. Before them, the Court acknowledged
that the congressional delegation was to the Treasury, not to the courts, and
that Treasury regulations should be upheld if they implement the statute
"'in some reasonable manner."' 9 1 After them, the Court emphasized that
"[t]he choice among reasonable interpretations is for the Commissioner, not
the courts."92 Similarly, the court offered two posterior citations from the
88 See Swallows Holding Ltd. v. Commissioner, 126 T.C. 96, 180-81 (2006) (Holmes,
J., dissenting) (tabulating the circuits), rev'd, 515 F.3d 162 (3d Cir. 2008); Steve R. Johnson,
Mayo and the Future of Tax Regulations, 130 TAX NOTES 1547, 1551 (Mar. 28, 2011).
E.g., Commissioner v. Portland Cement Co. of Utah, 450 U.S. 156, 169 (1981);
United States v. Cartwright, 411 U.S. 546, 550 (1973); United States v. Correll, 389 U.S.
299, 305-06 (1967).Based on the Supreme Court cases of this line, a circuit court stated:
"Our role in determining the validity of a Treasury regulation is a limited one." Gehl Co. v.
Commissioner, 795 F.2d 1324, 1328 (7th Cir. 1986).
Nat'l Muffler Dealers Ass'n v. United States,440 U.S. 472, 485 (1979).
91 Id. at 476-77 (quoting Cartwright, 411 U.S. at 550).
92 Id. at 488.
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pre-Chevron line. Both cases were deferential, both upheld the challenged
regulations, and both used considerations among the six as rationales. 93 To
read these components as deferential, then anti-deferential, then deferential
again would paint the Court as schizophrenic. The six listed considerations
should be read as of a piece with the material that preceded and succeeded
them. All are deferential in nature.
Fourth, in light of this deferential spirit, the six listed considerations
should be seen as plus factors, not minus factors. That is, the presence of
one or more would warrant greater than usual deference, but the absence of
one or more would not warrant less than usual deference.94 This reading
would be in line with how the Court treated plus factors in other cases (not
repudiated by Mayo)95 and would avoid the need to consign National
Muffler to Tartarus.
B. Chevron Not Insuperable
The application of Chevron is far from the seal of doom for a party
challenging an agency's action. Chevron is usually considered a deferential
standard. However, it is no walkover for the agency. Agency positions
have often been found invalid at step one as contrary to an unambiguous
statute.97 Less often, but still frequently enough to matter, judges find the
statute ambiguous but hold the agency's position to be unreasonable at step
two.9
9 Id. at 477 (citing Commissioner v. South Tex. Lumber Co., 333 U.S. 496, 501
(1948) & Helvering v. Winmill, 305 U.S. 79, 83 (1938)).
94 Id. (This approach is consistent with the language the Court used to introduce the six
factors: "[a] regulation may have particular force if ..... ).
9 E.g., Smiley v. Citibank (S.D.), 517 U.S. 735, 740 (1996) (long-standing agency
interpretations possess "a certain credential of reasonableness"); Dixon v. United States, 381
U.S. 68, 76 (1965) (absence of factors used to support Service position in prior case held not
to undercut Service position in current case).
96 E.g., WILLIAM D. POPKIN, MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION: POLITICAL LANGUAGE AND
THE POLITICAL PROCESS 582 (4th ed. 2005) (calling Chevron a "super-deferential approach").
9 See, e.g., Antonin Scalia, Judicial Deference to Administrative Interpretations of
Law, 1989 Duke L.J. 5 11, 520-21; Mark Seidenfeld, A Syncopated Chevron: Emphasizing
Reasoned Decisionmaking in Reviewing Agency Interpretations of Statutes, 73 TEx. L. REV.
83, 94-95 (1994); Note, "How Clear Is Clear" in Chevron's Step One?, 118 HARV. L. REV.
1687, 1691-92 (2005).
98 E.g., Goldstein v. SEC, 451 F.3d 873 (D.C. Cir. 2006); Northpoint Tech., Ltd. v.
FCC, 412 F.3d 145 (D. C. Cir. 2005); Abbot Labs. v. Young, 920 F.2d 984 (D.C. Cir. 1990),
cert. denied, 502 U.S. 819 (1991). A recent circuit court case invalidated a Treasury
regulation under Code section 263A. The court found that the regulation survived Chevron's
step one because the statute was ambiguous, but it invalidated the regulation under step two
as being an unreasonable interpretation of the statute. Dominion Res., Inc. v. United States,
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C Experience Under Mayo
As befits a case of its significance, Mayo has already, in its relatively
brief existence, been cited by scores of other decisions, from the Supreme
Court,99 lower federal courts in non-tax cases,100 and lower courts in tax
cases.
In tax, Mayo has been cited or discussed in diverse contexts, as
described below. One striking fact that emerges from the survey of these
cases is that taxpayers win with considerable frequency.
One area in which Mayo has been on prominent display is a line of tax
shelter cases involving the statute of limitations on assessment of additional
tax liabilities.101 Responding to a string of high-profile losses in court, in
2010 Treasury promulgated regulations102 providing that an extended
limitations period applies to a certain category of income tax deficiency. 0 3
The new regulation proved highly controversial.104 The lower federal
courts split in the numerous cases testing the validity of the regulations, and
the Supreme Court invalidated it.105 Mayo has been cited in decisions
holding for the government on the issue106 and in decisions holding for the
681 F.3d 1313, 1317-1319 (Fed. Cir. 2012).
9 Judulang v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 476, 484 n.7 (2011); Home Concrete & Supply, LLC
v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 1836, 1847 (2012).
10 E.g., City of Arlington, Tex. v. FCC,668 F.3d 229, 238 (5th Cir. 2012); Schafer v.
Astrue, 641 F.3d 49, 61 (4th Cir. 2011); Vill. of Barrington, Ill. v. Surface Transp. Bd., 636
F.3d 650, 659 (D.C. Cir. 2011).
to[ I.R.C. § 6229 (The limitations periods for assessments are generally set out as to
certain adjustments arising out of partnership transactions).
102 See Intermountain Ins. Serv. of Vail, LLC v. Commissioner, 650 F.3d 691, 701
(D.C. Cir. 2011); Salman Ranch, Ltd. v. Commissioner, 647 F.3d 929, 937 (10th Cir. 2011);
Grapevine Imps., Ltd. v. United States, 636 F.3d 1368, 1376 (Fed. Cir. 2011); see also
Treas. Reg. § 301.6229(c)(2) (2010); Treas. Reg. § 30 1.6501(e) (2010).
103 1.R.C. § 6501(a) (the normal limitations period is three years); I.R.C. § 6501(e) (The
statute provides a six-year limitations period when a taxpayer fails to report income in excess
of 25% of income reported on her federal income tax return. The new regulations provided
that this extended period applies not just to unreported receipts, but also to deficiencies that
result when the taxpayer claims inflated basis in property he sold or exchanged).
See Melinda Dunmire, Voting Colony off the Island, 131 TAX NOTES 1265 (June 20,
2011); Johnson, supra note 47.
105 United States v. Home Concrete & Supply, LLC, 132 S. Ct. 1836 (2011). For
discussion of Home Concrete and its significance, see Steve R. Johnson, Home Concrete:
After the Cheering, Problems, 31 ABA SEC. TAX'N NEWS Q. I (Summer 2012); Patrick J.
Smith, What We Didn't Learn from Home Concrete, 135 TAx NOTES 1625 (June 25, 2012);
William J. Wilkins, Implications of Home Concrete, 31 ABA SEC. TAX'N NEWS Q.25
(Summer 2012).
1o6 Intermountain Ins. Serv. of Vail, LLC v. Commissioner, 650 F.3d 691, 701 (D.C.
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taxpayer on it.10 7
Mayo has appeared in other lines of tax cases too. In some cases,
Mayo's deployment was of marginal significance; 1os in others it mattered
more. Taxpayers have lost many of the tax cases in which Mayo was
noted,109 although sometimes only narrowly."10  However, taxpayers
prevailed in many other such cases, including cases involving income
Ill 112 . 113tax, gift tax, and excise tax.
As the above survey reveals, taxpayers have not thus far fared badly in
the aggregate in tax cases invoking Mayo. When that fact is combined with
the realization that National Muffler was always a weak reed for taxpayers
and the real possibility of an agency losing under Chevron, it is fair to
conclude that Mayo, taken by itself, has not radically altered the balance
between taxpayers and the Service in litigation.
V. GOVERNMENTAL OVERREACHING-M4 YO WITH OTHER RULES
Part IV refuted the fear that Mayo, considered by itself, fundamentally
disadvantages taxpayers challenging the validity of Treasury regulations.
However, a less sanguine scenario may emerge when Mayo is put in a
larger context, that is, when it is combined with other rules of deference and
procedural possibilities. It is to that potentiality that we now turn.
Below, we first identify the values that should guide the formulation of
Cir. 2011); Salman Ranch, Ltd. v. Commissioner, 647 F.3d 929, 937 (10th Cir. 2011);
Grapevine Imps., Ltd. v. United States, 636 F.3d 1368, 1376 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
107 Home Concrete & Supply, LLC v. United States,634 F.3d 249, 257 (4th Cir. 2011),
aff'd, 132 S. Ct. 1836 (2011); Burks v. United States, 633 F.3d 347, 360 (5th Cir. 2011);
Carpenter Family Invs., LLC v. Commissioner, 136 T.C. 373, 377-78 (2011).
108 For example, one case holding for the Service cited Mayo for the proposition that
tax exclusions are construed narrowly. Sprint Nextel Corp. & Subsidiaries v. United States,
779 F. Supp. 2d 1184, 1186 (D. Kan. 201 1).That is a boilerplate proposition, well known
before Mayo, for which numerous other cases could have been cited instead of Mayo. See
generally Steve R. Johnson, Interpreting State Tax Exemptions, Deductions, and Credits, 51
ST. TAX NOTES 607 (Feb. 23, 2009).
109 E.g., Dickow v. United States, 654 F.3d 144, 149 (1st Cir. 2011); Goodrich Corp. v.
United States, 846 F. Supp. 2d 445, 449 (W.D.NC. 2012); Ambase Corp. v. United States,
834 F. Supp. 2d 71, 74 (D. Conn. 2011); Tigers Eye Trading, LLC v. Commissioner, 138
T.C. 67, 72 (2012).
110 In one prominent case, the taxpayer's argument came up just short in the trial court
but prevailed on appeal. Dominion Res., Inc. v. United States, 97 Fed. Cl. 239, 257 (2011),
rev'd, 681 F.3d 1313 (Fed. Cir. 2012).
II Mass. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. United States, 103 Fed. Cl. Ill, 150 (2012); Pullins v.
Commissioner, 136 T.C. 432, 441 (2011).
112 Estate of Petter v. Commissioner, 653 F.3d 1012, 1023 (9th Cir. 2011).
113 Cohen v. United States, 650 F.3d 717, 736 (D.C. Cir. 2011).
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tax regulations. Then we identify the other rules and principles that could
come into play and note the dangers that could be posed by too aggressive
combination of Mayo with other rules. Finally, we assess whether the
concern is purely theoretical or whether it has practical significance. I
conclude that, although Treasury and the Service typically behave fairly and
faithfully in administering the tax laws, history provides enough evidence
of actual or arguable overreaching that the concern developed here is worth
addressing.
A. Values
To fulfill its important role, regulation-making by the Treasury must
advance several core purposes. First and foremost among such purposes, of
course, is fidelity to the underlying statute. The duty of the interpreter is "to
find that interpretation which can most fairly be said to be imbedded in the
statute, in the sense of being most harmonious with its scheme and with the
general purposes that Congress manifested." 14  Thus, Treasury's
rulemaking authority is "the power to adopt regulations to carry into effect
the will of Congress as expressed by the statute."1 15
Second, to the extent the regulation contributes anything not already
found in the statue, the regulation entails an exercise of choice by Treasury.
How Treasury exercises that opportunity matters. Responsible interstitial
decision-making which is "fair" and "reasonable" to taxpayers, the federal
fisc, and third parties is the goal. 116
Third, countless transactions in our society are planned with an eye to
the Code and in anticipation of particular tax effects under the Code. If deal
making is to proceed with confidence, there must be a reasonable degree of
certitude and predictability about tax regulations. Thus, establishing and
protecting a reasonable sphere for private reliance is "one important
purpose for issuing Regulations." 17
Fourth, our system of taxation depends on a high degree of citizen "buy
114 NLRB v. Lion Oil Co., 352 U.S. 282, 297 (1957) (Frankfurter, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part).
1ts Manhattan Gen. Equip. Co. v. United States, 297 U.S. 129, 134 (1936).
116 See, e.g., Randolph E. Paul, Use and Abuse of Tax Regulations in Statutory
Construction, 49 YALE L.J. 660, 661 (1940) (quoting Sterling Oil & Gas Co. v. Lucas, 51
F.2d 413, 416 (W.D. Ky. 1931)).
117 Mitchell Rogovin, The Four R's: Regulations, Rulings, Reliance and Retroactivity:
A View From Within, 43 TAXES 756, 760 (1965); see also H. R. 1882, 70th Cong. (1st Sess.
1928) ("It is believed that sound administration properly places upon the Government the
responsibility and burden of interpreting the law and prescribing regulations upon which
taxpayers may rely.").
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in." The Service audits only a small percentage of the hundreds of millions
of returns filed each year. its Thus, a central goal for all parts of tax
administration - including the regulations-writing process - must be to
maintain citizen confidence in the system and to avoid alienating
taxpayers.' 1 9
Finally, another value - the participation of taxpayers in the
regulations process - derives from the above purposes. The opportunity to
participate, such as through the ability of citizens to comment on proposed
tax regulations, can improve the accuracy and fidelity of regulations to their
statutes by pointing out where Treasury may have failed to reflect the will
of Congress. It can improve the fairness and reasonableness of regulations
by identifying practical consequences of which tax regulators may be
unaware. It can maintain confidence in the tax system by giving taxpayers a
voice in it. Thus, public participation is essential in the rulemaking process,
both generallyl20 and in tax.121
B. Potentially Dangerous Combinations
As seen in part III.A. 1 above, Mayo makes clear that Chevron applies
to general authority as well as specific authority Treasury regulations, and
Mayo dispensed with the relevance of factors such as agency inconsistency,
regulatory contemporaneity, and issuance of regulations during litigation.
That creates considerable - although, as shown in part III, not intolerable
- administrative flexibility.
But that flexibility can be leveraged by Treasury and the Service using
other rules, some established, some as yet uncertain. Below, we consider
four such possibilities: Brand X, Auer, Code section 7805(b), and sub-
regulation Service guidance. Thereafter, we note the potential for their
"1 See, e.g., RICHARDSON, BORISON& JOHNSON, supra note 2, at 95; Steve Johnson, The
1998 Act and the Resources Link Between Tax Compliance and Tax Simplification, 51 U.
KAN. L. REV. 1013, 1015-27 (2003).
119 U.S. Gov'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-09-567, TAx ADMINISTRATION: IRS
SHOULD EVALUATE PENALTIES AND DEVELOP A PLAN TO Focus ITS EFFORTS 8 (2009) ("[I]t is
widely believed that taxpayers are more likely to comply voluntarily if they believe that the
tax code is implemented fairly and consistently across taxpayers.").
120 E.g., BERNARD SCHWARTZ, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW § 4.12 (3d ed. 1991) (stating that
administrative law rulemaking procedures enhance transparency, accountability, and
democratic legitimacy through public participation); see also Am. Hosp. Ass'n v. Bowen,
834 F.2d 1037, 1044 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (observing that the comment process "reintroduces
public participation and fairness to affected parties after governmental authority has been
delegated to unrepresentative agencies") (quoting Batterton v. Marshall, 648 F.2d 694, 703
(D.C. Cir. 1980)).





In 2005, the Supreme Court decided another key case. In Brand X, the
Supreme Court held that a subsequent regulation trumps prior judicial
interpretations of a statute as long as two conditions are met: the regulation
qualifies for Chevron deference and the prior cases did not base their results
on an unambiguous statute. 122
Since the case was handed down, hundreds of tax and non-tax
decisions have cited Brand X, and a substantial literature has developed as
to it.123 Despite this, a number of important issues remain as to the scope
and meaning of Brand X. They include whether the prior judicial decision
must have expressly stated that the statute is unambiguous, whether any
such statement is conclusive, even if it is objectively incorrect, and whether
the clarity or lack thereof of the statute is assessed only from the statutory
text or from, as well, any pertinent legislative history.124
2. Auer
The Supreme Court has stated: "It is well established 'that an agency's
construction of its own regulations is entitled to substantial deference."' 125
The principle was announced over sixty years ago in the Seminole Rock
case.126 These days, though, it is more often identified by reference to the
1997 Auer case, in which the Court instructed that an agency's
interpretation of its own regulation is "controlling" unless it is "'plainly
erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation."'l27 The Supreme Court
reaffirmed its adherence to Auer three times in 2011 and 2012.128
122 Nat'I Cable & Telecomm. Ass'n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 982
(2005).
123 E.g., Doug Geyser, Note, Courts Still "Say What the Law Is": Explaining the
Functions ofthe Judiciary and Agencies After Brand X, 106 CoLUM. L. REV. 2129 (2006).
124 See, e.g., Johnson, supra note 47, at 846-49. The Court had the opportunity to
clarify some of these issues in United States v. Home Concrete Supply, LLC, 132 S. Ct.
1836 (2012), but avoided the issues. See, e.g., Smith, supra note 105, at 1625.
125 Martin v. OSHRC, 499 U.S. 144, 150 (1991) (quoting Lyng v. Payne, 476 U.S. 926,
939 (1986)).
126 Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co., 325 U.S. 410,413-14 (1945).
127 Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 461 (1997) (quoting Robertson v. Methow Valley
Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332, 359 (1989)).
128 Christopher v. SmithKline Beecham, 132 S. Ct. 2156 (2012); Talk Am., Inc. v.
Mich. Bell Tel. Co., 131 S. Ct. 2254 (2011); Chase Bank USA, N.A. v. McCoy, 131 S. Ct.
871 (2011).
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In the Supreme Court, Auer appears to be a rule of super-deference.
According to a recent study, under most deference doctrines, the rates at
which courts affirm agency positions cluster within fairly comparable
ranges, averaging around seventy percent." The one notable exception is the
Auer doctrine. The Supreme Court affirms agency interpretations of agency
rules at a much higher rate - 90.9% - than the roughly 70% rate at which
it upholds other agency decisions."l 29 It is not clear, though, that the lower
federal courts and the state courts - although deferential - are quite as
deferential to agency interpretations of their regulations.130
3. Section 7805(b)
"Retroactivity is not favored in the law. Thus, congressional
enactments and administrative rules will not be construed to have
retroactive effect unless their language requires this result."13 1 What, then,
does the Code provide as to retroactive tax regulations?
Before 1996, Code section 7805(b) provided that Treasury or the
Service "may prescribe the extent, if any, to which any ruling or regulation,
relating to the internal revenue laws, shall be applied without retroactive
effect." The exercise of this power was subject to challenge on an "abuse of
discretion" standard,132 and Treasury regulations sometimes were
129 Richard J. Pierce, Jr., What Do the Studies of Judicial Review of Agency Actions
Mean?, 63 ADMIN. L. REv. 77, 85 (2011) (citations omitted); see also William N. Eskridge,
Jr. & Lauren E. Baer, The Continuum of Deference: Supreme Court Treatment of Agency
Statutory Interpretations from Chevron to Hamdan, 96 GEO. L.J. 1083 (2008) (studying
Supreme Court deference doctrines).
130 Steve R. Johnson, Deference to Tax Agencies' Interpretations of Their Regulations,
60 ST. TAX NOTES 665 (May 30, 2011) [hereinafter Deference to Agencies' Interpretations];
see also Steve R. Johnson, New Light on Auer/Seminole Rock Deference,61 ST. TAX NOTES
441 (Aug. 15, 2011) [hereinafter Auer/Seminole Rock Deference).
131 Bowen v. Georgetown Univ. Hosp., 488 U.S. 204, 208 (1988); see also id. at 220
(Scalia, J., concurring) (stating that an unreasonably retroactive regulation may be
"arbitrary" or "capricious" under the APA and thus invalid); Landgraf v. USI Film Prods.,
511 U.S. 244, 265 (1994) (stating that "the presumption against retroactive legislation is
deeply rooted in our jurisprudence, and embodies a legal doctrine centuries older than our
Republic."); Retail, Wholesale & Dep't Store Union, AFL-CIO v. NLRB, 466 F.2d 380, 390
(D.C. Cir. 1972) (offering five-factor test for whether retroactivity is permitted).However,
some have perceived emergence of a more modem view which embraces retroactivity. See,
e.g., Ann Woolhandler, Public Rights, Private Rights, and Statutory Retroactivity,94 GEO.
L.J. 1015 (2006).
132 E.g., Dixon v. United States, 381 U.S. 68, 72-73 (1965); Automobile Club of Mich.
v. Commissioner, 353 U.S. 180, 183-84 (1957); Lesavoy Found., v. Commissioner, 238
F.2d 589 (3d Cir. 1956).
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invalidated on this ground.133
In 1996, motivated by the belief "that it is generally inappropriate for
Treasury to issue retroactive regulations, 134 Congress amended section
7805(b). The current version of the statute provides that, in general,
Treasury regulations may not be made effective prior to the date on which
they were proposed.135
However, the rigor of this prohibition and the certainty of its
application are considerably reduced by a number of statutory exceptions.
Specifically,
* The prohibition does "not apply to regulations filed or issued
within 18 months of the date of the enactment of the statutory
provision to which the regulation relates."' 36
* Treasury "may provide that any regulation may take effect or
apply retroactively to prevent abuse."1 37
* Regulations may be applied retroactively when they correct
procedural defects in the issuance of prior regulations or when
they pertain to internal Treasury policies, practices, or
133 E.g., Helvering v. RJ. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 306 U.S. 110, 114-16 (1939).
Reynolds sparked extensive commentary from some of the finest tax minds of their (or any)
generation. E.g., Erwin N. Griswold, A Summary of the Regulations Problem, 54 HARv. L.
REv. 398 (1941); Paul, supra note 116; Stanley S. Surrey, The Scope and Effect of Treasury
Regulations Under the Income, Estate, and Gift Taxes, 88 U. PA. L. REv. 556 (1940); see
also Ellsworth C. Alvord, Treasury Regulations and the Wilshire Oil Case, 40 COLUM. L.
REv. 252 (1940); Robert C. Brown, Regulations, Reenactment, and the Revenue Acts, 54
HARV. L. REV. 379 (1941).
The large body of more recent scholarship on retroactivity in tax includes David W. Ball,
Retroactive Application of Treasury Rules and Regulations, 17 N.M.L. REv. 139 (1987);
Michael J. Graetz, Legal Transitions: The Case for Retroactivity in Income Tax Revision,
126 U. PA. L. REv. 47 (1977); John S. Nolan & Victor Thuronyi, Retroactive Application of
Changes in I.R.S. or Treasury Department Positions, 61 TAXES 777 (1983); Andrew Pruitt,
Judicial Deference to Retroactive Interpretative Treasury Regulations,79 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 1558 (2011); James M. Puckett, Embracing the Queen of Hearts: Deference to
Retroactive Tax Rules, 40 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. (forthcoming 2013); Toni Robinson,
Retroactivity: The Case for Better Regulation of Federal Tax Regulations, 48 OHIO ST. L.J.
773 (1987); Bryan T. Camp, Note, The Retroactivity of Treasury Regulations: Paths to
Finding Abuse ofDiscretion, 7 VA. TAx REv. 509 (1988).
134 H. R. REP. No. 104-506, at 44 (1996); see also Benjamin J. Cohen & Catherine A.
Harrington, Is the Internal Revenue Service Bound by Its Own Regulations and Rulings?, 51
TAX LAW. 675, 689-99 (1998) (describing congressional efforts to stop retroactive
rulemaking by Treasury).
135 I.R.C. § 7805(b)(1).
136 I.R.C. § 7805(b)(2).
137 I.R.C. § 7805(b)(3).
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procedures.13 8
* The prohibition "may be superseded by a legislative grant from
Congress authorizing [Treasury] to prescribe the effective date
with respect to any regulation."l 3 9
4. Sub-Regulation Service Guidance
In general administrative law, the traditional distinction is between
legislative rules (which have binding legal effect) and interpretive rules and
other agency informal guidance positions (which do not have binding legal
effect). Yet this distinction - easy to state in the abstract - has proved to
be enormously troubling in actual cases.140 Scholars continue to engage in
robust debate about the viability of this traditional distinction and possible
alternatives to it.141
The proper level of deference to be accorded to sub-regulation
positions issued by the Service is a topic that has provoked considerable
commentary over the years.142 The debate continues today.143
As a theoretical matter, one could argue for a higher level of force
13 I.R.C. §7805(b)(4), (b)(5).
139 I.R.C. § 7805(b)(6).In addition, Treasury may allow taxpayers to elect to apply
regulations retroactively. See 1.R.C. § 7805(b)(7).
140 See, e.g., David L. Franklin, Legislative Rules, Nonlegislative Rules, and the Perils
of the Short Cut, 120 YALE L.J. 276, 278 (2010) ("There is perhaps no more vexing
conundrum in the field of administrative law than the problem of defining a workable
distinction between legislative and nonlegislative rules."); Richard J. Pierce Jr.,
Distinguishing Legislative Rules from Interpretive Rules, 52 ADMIN. L. REv. 547, 547 (2000)
("For over fifty years, courts and commentators have struggled to identify, and to apply,
criteria that are appropriate to distinguish between legislative and interpretive rules. The
results have not been pretty.").
141 Recent entries in the debate include David L. Franklin, Two Cheers for Procedural
Review of Guidance Documents, 90 TEx. L. REV. 111 (2012); Mark Seidenfeld, Substituting
Substantive for Procedural Review of Guidance Documents, 90 TEx. L. REV. 331 (2011).
142 The extended debate between Professors Caron and Galler remains useful. See Paul
L. Caron, Tax Myopia Meets Tax Hyperopia: The Unproven Case of Increased Judicial
Deference to Revenue Rulings, 57 OHIO ST. L. J. 637 (1996); Caron, supra note 47; Linda
Galler, Judicial Deference to Revenue Rulings: Reconciling Divergent Standards, 56 OHno
ST. L.J. 1037 (1995); Linda Galler, Emerging Standards for Judicial Review of IRS Revenue
Rulings, 72 B.U.L. REv. 841 (1992).
143 E.g., Kathryn Sedo & Katrina Wessbecker, Should Courts Ever Give Deference to
Revenue Procedures?, 2012 TNT 7-4 (Jan. 11, 2012); Kristin E. Hickman, IRB Guidance:
The No Man's Land of Tax Code Interpretation, 2009 MicH. ST. L. REv. 239 (2009);
Christopher M. Pietruszkiewicz, Discarded Deference: Judicial Independence in Informal
Agency Guidance, 74 TENN. L. REv. 1 (2006); Irving Salem, Ellen P. Aprill & Linda Galler,
ABA Section of Taxation Report of the Task Force on Judicial Deference, 57 TAX LAw. 717,
744-46 & 769-72 (2004).
2952012]
Virginia Tax Review
being accorded Service guidance documents. For instance, one factor
sometimes considered in assessing legislative character is whether the
agency action "affect[ed] substantial individual rights and obligations.",144
The Code imposes a penalty (generally equal to twenty percent of the
resulting underpayment of tax145 ) when a taxpayer's return reflects
"[n]egligence or disregard of rules or regulations,"l46 and the applicable
Treasury regulations include revenue rulings and notices as among such
"rules and regulations."l47 The penalty also can be imposed as to a
"substantial understatement of income tax" when substantial authority does
not exist to support the taxpayer's return position(s),148 and revenue rulings
and revenue procedures are included within the types of authority for this
purpose.149
5. Potential Combinations
Even brief reflection will suggest the potential for overreaching that
could exist were Treasury and the Service to aggressively assert the above
doctrines in conjunction with Mayo. One such possibility would be
combining Brand X and Mayo. The government should not be able to use
Brand X to administratively reverse a decision that applied Chevron to
invalidate a tax regulation. This is because a predicate for application of
Brand Xis that the regulation be Chevron-entitled.
However, scores of cases have invalidated Treasury regulations on
grounds other than Chevron. Treasury could seek to overturn such decisions
by promulgating new regulations, perhaps little changed from the original,
invalidated versions. In the ensuing litigation, it would assert first that,
under Brand X, a subsequent regulation can trump a prior judicial decision
and second that, under Mayo, this is so even if the regulation is general
authority in nature, was not contemporaneous with the Code section at
issue, and was issued during litigation for the purpose of affecting the
outcome of that litigation.
In addition, the government might be able to apply that new or
amended regulation retroactively. The exceptions to the 1996 anti-
retroactivity provision have not been well tested and defined in litigation.
If Chevron deference is pushed downwards, below regulations to sub-
regulation Service guidance documents, the government would have even
14 Morton v. Ruiz, 415 U.S. 199, 200 (1974).
145 I.R.C. § 6662(a).
146 I.R.C. § 6662(b)(1).
147 Treas. Reg. § 1.6662-3(b)(2) (as amended in 2003).
148 I.R.C. § 6662(b)(2), (d)(2)(B)(i).
149 Treas. Reg. § 1.6662-4(d)(3)(iii) (as amended in 2003).
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more leeway. These positions typically do not go through the APA notice-
and-comment process, so the benefits to the system would not obtain.
Moreover, the Service has considerable discretion as to whether to apply
sub-regulation positions retroactively, subject to abuse-of-discretion
150
review.
Perhaps most problematic of all, the government might combine Mayo
and Auer. That is, it might write an ambiguous regulation, claiming
Chevron deference for it under Mayo. Then it might wait to see how
taxpayers conduct their transactions and how the government's revenue
interests might best be served by interpreting the regulation as applied to
those transactions. Whichever interpretation proved fiscally felicitous, the
government could assert Auer deference for that interpretation.
One may hope that such strategic behavior would occur only rarely, but
respected commentators and jurists have sounded warnings. For example,
Kenneth Gideon, a former Service Chief Counsel and Assistant Secretary of
the Treasury for Tax Policy, has stated: "[lit's hard for me to see what the
limitation .. . is [on the trend in judicial deference to support administrative
rulemaking]."' 5 He questions whether the new environment "might not
allow officials in new administrations carte blanche to adopt their own
policy preferences under the guise of rulemaking, even ignoring public
comments if they carefully follow procedural rules." 52 In his view,
"Chevron, Mayo, and Brand X set up a system that probably already allows
such a scenario," which may mean that "fighting over statutory
interpretation in tax litigation is effectively doomed [and] the only
constraints are political." 153
A recent controversy bears on these fears. Part IV.C above notes the
litigation as to Treasury's attempt to apply the six-year limitations period of
Code section 6501(e) to basis overstatement situations. In brief, in 2009,
after losing a string of high-profile cases on the issue, Treasury issued
regulations in both temporary and proposed form. The temporary
regulations were issued without notice and comment. The proposed
regulations later became final after going through notice and comment. The
regulations instantiated the government's largely unsuccessful litigation
position, and they were made applicable to all cases not yet closed under the
statute of limitations. 154
150 See I.R.C. § 7805(b)(8).
151 Coder, supra note 6, at 1229 (quoting Kenneth Gideon).
152 Id. at 1230 (asking "[wlhat is the stopping point? Is that the tax system we had in
mind?").
1 Id. See generally Mark Seidenfeld, The Irrelevance of Politics for Arbitrary and
Capricious Review, 90 WASH U. L. REv. 141 (2012).
154 The history is detailed in Kim Marie Boylan, Roger J. Jones & Andrew R.
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The lower courts split on the legality of the new regulations, and the
Supreme Court invalidated it. In the Fourth Circuit case eventually affirmed
by the Court, Judge Wilkinson decried what he perceived to be
overreaching by the Treasury and the Service:
Yet it remains the case that agencies are not a law unto themselves.
No less than any other organ of government, they operate in a
system in which the last words in law belong to Congress and the
Supreme Court. What the IRS seeks to do in extending the
statutory limitations period goes against what I believe are plain
instructions of Congress, which have not changed, and the plain
words of the Court which have not been retracted.. .. This seems
to me something of an inversion of the universe and to pass the
point where the beneficial application of agency expertise gives
way to a lack of accountability and a risk of arbitrariness. 155
C Practical Significance
We have seen that Mayo can be leveraged with other rules and
principles to create possibilities for overreaching. But should we be
concerned about these theoretical possibilities? Is the chance that the
possibilities may come to fruition sufficiently large that we should give
thought to how to curb them? Despite my respect and admiration for
Treasury and the Service, I believe the answer is "yes."
The Supreme Court has wisely instructed that, in some situations, we
are "left in the first instance to the good sense and common decency of the
[tax] collecting authorities.,,156 This typically works. Treasury and the
Service set high aspirations of professionalism for themselves,157 and their
Roberson, Absolute Power Corrupts Absolutely: Basis Overstatement and the Six-Year
Limitations Period - Should the IRS Be Allowed to Re-Write the Law Retroactively?, 2011
TAx MAN. MEMO. 235.The authors were taxpayers' counsel in the Home Concrete case.
Issuance of temporary regulations without notice and comment with the intention to later
issue permanent regulations after notice and comment is sometimes called the "interim-
final" approach. Treasury avails itself of this approach with some frequency. See generally
Brief for Prof Kristin E. Hickman as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents, United States
v. Home Concrete & Supply, LLC, 132 S. Ct. 1836 (2012) (No. 11-139).
155 Home Concrete & Supply, LLC v. United States, 634 F.3d 249, 259 (4th Cir. 2011)
(Wilkinson, J., concurring), aff'd, 132 S. Ct. 1836 (2012).
156 United States v. Rodgers, 461 U.S. 677, 699 (1983).
157 "[I]t is the duty of the Service to carry out [tax] policy by correctly applying the
laws enacted by Congress; to determine the reasonable meaning of various Code provisions
in light of the Congressional purpose in enacting them; and to perform this work in a fair and
impartial manner, with neither a government nor a taxpayer point of view."Rev. Proc. 64-22,
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performance meets their aspirations in the great majority of cases.
The comfort we derive from this fact, however, should not make us
heedless as to the abuse potentials described above. There are times when
Treasury and the Service yield to overzealousness or to intransigence.
Consider three actual or arguable examples. First, for generations,
Treasury has taken the position that general authority regulations are
interpretive regulations for APA purposes. Although Treasury usually
submits proposed general authority regulations to notice and comment, the
"general authority regulations are interpretive regulations" position, if
correct, would mean that there would be no legal requirements to use notice
and comment as to such regulations.
This position, however, is clearly incorrect. Regulations that seek to
create binding law are legislative, not interpretive, for APA purposes
whether they are promulgated under general or specific authority.' 5 9
Despite Mayo, the government appears not to have fundamentally revised
this position.160 This insistence undermines one's confidence in the
government's ability to follow administrative law rules.
Second, the saga described above of the section 6501(e) regulations is
widely viewed, as Judge Wilkinson viewed it, as a case of abuse by the
government. I and others believe that the regulations should have been
promulgated prospectively, not retroactively.i61
Why did the government take such an aggressive approach? The
apparent explanation is that the Treasury and the Service were striking
against tax shelter transactions that the Service had failed to process within
the normal three-year limitations period. 62
But the end does not justify the means. The lengths to which the
government has shown itself willing to go in its war against shelters raises
1964-1 C.B. 689.
15 See Schmid, supra note 4, at 541; Brief for Appellant at 25-26, Wilmington Partners
L.P. v. Commissioner, No. 10-4183 (2d Cir. Sept. 10, 2012); Brief for Appellant at 52-60,
Intermountain Ins. Serv. of Vail, LLC v. Commissioner, No. 10-1204 (D.C. Cir. June 11,
2012).
159 See, e.g., Johnson, supra note 47, at 843-45.
160 See 1.R.M. § 32.1.1.2.8 (Sept. 23, 2011) (conceding that some general authority
Treasury regulations might be legislative but maintaining that most are interpretive in
nature); see generally Jeremiah Coder, Current Guidance Process Sufficient for Judicial
Deference, Butler Says, 2011 TNT 216-4 (Nov. 14, 2011).
161 See Johnson, supra note 47, at 852.
162 This is evident from the government's briefs in these cases. Although the
substantive merits of the shelters were not at issue, the government's briefs repeatedly stress
the tax shelter aspects. E.g., Brief for the United States at 3-7, United States v. Home
Concrete & Supply, LLC, 132 S. Ct. 1836 (2012) (No. 11-139).
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the specter that it may similarly lose perspective in future controversies.
Third, Treasury and the Service have done this sort of thing before. In
2003, again as part of the war on tax shelters, Treasury amended regulation
section 1.752-6 to alter the definition of "liabilities" for purposes of Code
section 752. It did so retroactively, claiming authority to do so under a
provision of the Community Renewal Tax Relief Act of 2000.164 However,
it may well be the case that, in doing so, Treasury exceeded the authority
conferred by the statute. Although some courts have upheld the
regulation, many others have not.166
In short, I think there is enough evidence that Treasury and the Service
sometimes depart from their usual probity in administering the tax laws.
That being so, we should not blithely ignore the potential for overreaching
that exists in the conjunction of Mayo with other rules of law.
VI. CURBING THE POTENTIAL FOR OVERREACHING
Part V explained why the possibility of governmental overreaching in
the new tax administration environment should be addressed. This part
offers suggestions as to the specific steps that should be taken.
These consist of arguments available to taxpayers' counsel when
challenging alleged excesses in tax rulemaking. In most cases, the
arguments are within existing doctrine but have too often been ignored or
underused. In some cases, the arguments would call upon courts to make
reasonable modifications of existing doctrine.
The arguments divide into four classes. They are arguments based on
delegation, procedure, substance, and construction.
163 "[I]n its war against tax shelters, Treasury has itself gone too far in pushing the
limits of the law. Treasury's failure to comply with the procedural requirements that
Congress imposed upon it is just as corrosive to the tax system as the behavior of tax shelter
rogues."Brief for Professor Kristin E. Hickman as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents,
supra note 154, at 35.
16 Community Renewal Tax Relief Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-554, § 309, 114 Stat.
2763A-587, at 2763A-638.
165 E.g., Cemco Investors, LLC v. United States, 515 F.3d 749, 752 (7th Cir. 2008),
cert. denied, 555 U.S. 823 (2008); Maguire Partners-Master Inv., LLC v. United States, 2009
WL279100, at *18-20 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 4, 2009), aff'd sub nom. Thomas Inv. Partners, Ltd. v.
United States, 444 Fed. Appx. (9th Cir. 2011).
166 E.g., Sala v. United States, 552 F. Supp. 2d 1167, 1197 (D. Colo. 2008), rev'd on
other grounds, 613 F.3d 1249 (10th Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 91 (2011); Klamath
Strategic Inv. Fund, LLC v. United States, 440 F. Supp. 2d 608, 626 (E.D. Tex. 2006);
Murfam Farms, LLC v. United States, 88 Fed. Cl. 516, 526-27 (2009); Stobie Creek Invs.,
LLC v. United States, 82 Fed. Cl. 636, 671 (2008), aff'd, 608 F.3d 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2010).
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A. Delegation Arguments
Rulemaking is a quasi-legislative function. It is fundamental that an
administrative agency, including the Treasury, can exercise
rulemaking power only to the extent that Congress has conferred such
power upon it. Neither Chevron nor Mayo changes this. Delegation was a
key rationale advanced in Chevron;169 Mayo recognized delegation to be
"the ultimate question."1
70
Post-Chevron cases have made it clear that Chevron applies only when
Congress delegated authority to the agency and the agency promulgated the
regulation in question in the exercise of that authority.171 Accordingly, if
the taxpayer can demonstrate that the position taken in the Treasury
regulation is outside the sphere of the congressionally delegated authority,
that position should fail.
Depending on the circumstances of the given case, three delegation
arguments are potentially available with respect to an overreaching
regulation. The potential arguments are: (1) the regulation goes beyond the
terms of the statutory delegation at issue; (2) the regulation adds a new
requirement or limitation not in the statute; and (3) the choice made in the
regulation involves too fundamental a matter and should be made only by
Congress itself, not by Treasury or any other agency.
1. Beyond the Terms of the Delegation
As noted in part III.A.1 above, Treasury regulations are promulgated
under either of two types of delegations: the general authority of Code
section 7805(a) and specific authority set out in particular Code sections.
Thus far, taxpayers usually have not attempted to correlate the regulations
in question with the precise language appearing in the general or specific
167 E.g., Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 415-16 (1971);
City of Arlington v. FCC, 668 F.3d 229 (5th Cir. 2012); Farmworker Justice Fund, Inc. v.
Brock, 811 F.2d 613, 619-20 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
168 E.g., Feller v. Commissioner, 135 T.C. 497, 530-31 (2010) (Gustafson, J.,
dissenting).
169 Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843-44
(1984).
170 Mayo Found. for Med. Educ. & Research v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 704, 714
(2011) (quoting Long Island Care at Home, Ltd. v. Coke, 551 U.S. 158, 173 (2007)). Last
year, the Court made delegation a central part of Brand X. United States v. Home Concrete
Supply, LLC, 132 S. Ct. 1836, 1843 (2012).
171 E.g., United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 226-27 (2001). See generally Lisa




delegation. This avenue deserves greater exploration and may prove a
useful check on overreaching regulations.
The operative language of section 7805(a) gives Treasury authority to
issue regulations "needful . .. for the enforcement of' the Code. Most
taxpayers' representatives assume that this language confers broad authority
upon Treasury. But this assumption has not been well tested in case law
focusing specifically on the precise statutory language, and the assumption
may be wrong. For example, Stanley Surrey, one of the leading architects of
the modem federal tax structure, believed that the strength of the section
7805(a) language "would hardly seem adequate ... to support a delegation
of legislative power" and thus that general authority regulations lack the
force of law and are not entitled to deference.172 Similarly, a leading current
commentator on deference issues in tax finds the "enforcement" language
of section 7805(a) to be narrow, not broad, in scope.m
The language used in specific authority sections is dazzling in variety.
Sometimes it is far broader than "enforcement"; often times it is
narrower.174 When it is narrower, the question arises whether the
government could nonetheless argue for the section 7805(a) standard. The
question would be whether the specific authority of the particular section
and the general authority of section 7805(a) are independent options
available to Treasury17 5 or whether the narrower specific delegation
controls over the broader general delegation. I believe the latter view is
preferable because of the well-established principle of construction that the
particular controls over the general. 7 6
A regulation is valid only to the extent that it accords with the statutory
delegation on which it is based. Thus, assuming that the argument has been
properly raised, a court assessing a challenge to a regulation should identify
the precise statutory language of the delegation in question, then determine
whether the regulation is within the scope of that language.
172 Surrey, supra note 133, at 557-58 (1940).
m See Salem, supra note 66, at 1333 n.59.
174 For descriptions of some of the patterns, see Johnson, supra note 47, at 850-52.
17s See, e.g., Tualatin Valley Builders Supply, Inc. v. United States, 522 F.3d 937, 942
(9th Cir. 2008) (stating that the "broad authority [of section 7805(a)] supplements the
specific grant of authority that Congress gave the IRS in [a particular Code section].").The
Treasury Decision accompanying a promulgated regulation typically states the Code section
under whose authority the regulation is being issued.
176 E.g., Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 550-51 (1974); Bulova Watch Co. v. United
States, 365 U.S. 753, 761 (1961). See generally Steve R. Johnson, When General Statutes
and Specific Statutes Conflict, 57 ST. TAx NOTES 113 (July 12, 2010).
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2. Adds a New Requirement or Limitation
A second delegation argument draws upon a line of cases holding that
tax regulations cannot add requirements or limitations not in the statute and
not fairly inferable from it. These cases were more prominent in prior
decades,1 77 but they never have been repudiated and are sometimes still
invoked. Portions of many regulations have been invalidated on this
basis.17 9
In deciding whether the position in the regulation is fairly inferable
from the statute, there is a helpful line of recent Supreme Court authority.
The Court has instructed that Congress does not "hide elephants in
mouseholes.,,1s In other words, a particular result demands a firm footing
in the text, structure, or purpose of the statute. It will not be lightly inferred
from statutory wisps and fragments.18 'This principle has been applied in tax
cases also.182
In order for this argument to have maximum effect in curbing
excessive regulation, courts will have to be disabused of sloppy application
of Chevron. As seen above, under Chevron, statutory silence or ambiguity
is viewed as a delegation to the agency of authority to fill in the gap or
gaps. This is understandable when the statute addresses a matter but does
so in an unclear fashion. It also is understandable when the statute addresses
177 E.g., Koshland v. Helvering, 298 U.S. 441, 446-47 (1936); Arrow Fastener Co. v.
Commissioner, 76 T.C. 423, 430 (1981) (both holding that when the statute is clear,
Treasury and the Service have no power to amend it by regulation); Sterling Oil & Gas Co.
v. Lucas, 51 F.2d 413, 416 (W.D. Ky. 1931) (the Service "has no right either to enlarge or to
take from the provisions of the [tax statute]").
178 E.g., Feller v. Commissioner, 135 T.C. 497, 526 (2010) (Gustafson, J., dissenting).In
a recently filed suit, the Institute for Justice and others claimed that new regulations
licensing and regulating return preparers exceed the reach of statutory authority. They
prevailed at the trial court level. Loving v. Internal Rev. Serv., No. I2-385(JEB), 2013 WL
204667 (D.D.C. Jan. 18, 2013). The government intends to appeal.
179 E.g., United States v. Calamaro, 354 U.S. 351, 358-59 (1957); Am. Standard, Inc. v.
United States, 602 F.2d 256 (Ct. Cl. 1979); Caterpillar Tractor Co. v. United States, 218 Ct.
Cl. 517, 526 (1978); Hughes Int'l Sales Corp. v. Commissioner, 100 T.C. 293, 304 (1993);
Estate of Boeshore v. Commissioner, 78 T.C. 523, 527 (1982).
180 Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass'ns, Inc., 531 U.S. 457, 468 (2001).
181 Id.; see also Chamber of Commerce of United States v. Whiting, 131 S. Ct. 1968,
2004 (2011); Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3250 (2010).
182 E.g., Colonial Am. Life Ins. Co. v. Commissioner, 491 U.S. 244, 260 (1989) ("We
find it incredible that Congress, with but a whisper, would have [allowed] a deduction of this
magnitude.").
183 See Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843-844
(1984). But see Mark Seidenfeld, Chevron's Foundation, 86 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 273, 276-
278 (2011) (rejecting congressional intent to delegate as the basis for Chevron).
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the general area but not all of the details as to it.
This notion is less understandable, however, when nothing in the
statute comes close to addressing a matter set out in a regulation. For
example, if a statute dealing only with candy is silent about cheese and
automobiles, it should not be viewed as authorizing the relevant agency to
write regulations as to cheese and automobiles.
This point was made by Judge Gustafson of the Tax Court in a pre-
Mayo case. He wrote:
Statutory specificity about one subject cannot sensibly be
construed as gap-creating "silence" about another
subject ... .When Congress states a plain and unambiguous term
involving "the amount shown as the tax by the taxpayer on his
return", the IRS cannot take that enactment as an occasion to craft
rules about different subject matter not addressed in the statute -
i.e., excess withholding credits not shown by the taxpayer and not
appearing on the return - as if Congress had left a gap to be filled
. 184
mn.
This principle bears on the "adds a requirement or limitation not in the
statute" objection to tax regulations. An aggressive reading of the idea that
statutory silence is a delegation to fill gaps would hold that Chevron
rendered obsolete the line of cases on which this objection is based. 8 5
However, the objection remains viable. The principle described by Judge
Gustafson is what preserves that viability in the era of Mayo. This principle
is the counter to an overly broad (and analytically sloppy) notion of
Chevron's teaching as to delegation.
3. Choice Appropriate for Congress Only
Another delegation argument arises out of the separation of powers
doctrine, which is the conceptual basis of delegation. Congress has the
186constitutional authority to write the tax laws. However, the Supreme
Court has taught that the articles of the Constitution governing Congress,
the executive, and the judiciary are not hermetically sealed off from one
184 Feller, 135 T.C. at 535 (Gustafson, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original).
185 Cf Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 596 (1983) ("Yet ever since the
inception of the tax code, Congress has seen fit to vest in those administering the tax laws
very broad authority to interpret those laws. In an area as complex as the tax system, the
agency Congress vests with administrative responsibility must be able to exercise its
authority to meet changing conditions and new problems.").
186 U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 1.
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other.is7 Thus, although Congress's role in lawmaking is primary, some
lawmaking authority resides in each of the three branches of the federal
government.18 8
The task, therefore, is to tell where the lawmaking power of agencies
(like the Treasury) ends, the point beyond which only Congress can
legislate. The line, of course, cannot be drawn with crystal clarity to
anticipate all cases, but several Supreme Court decisions have offered a
useful tool. These decisions apply a "too big" principle; that is, they teach
that certain decisions are so fundamental that they should be made only by
Congress, not by an agency.18
Put in terms of delegation doctrine, the "too big" principle can take
either or both of two forms. The stronger form would be constitutional, that
the separation of powers doctrine prevents Congress from delegating the
power to make choices of fundamental significance.190 The weaker form
would be a matter of statutory construction, that the courts will not presume
that Congress intended to delegate to an agency the power to make choices
of the most fundamental significance to the statutory scheme.
Two illustrations - Swallows Holding and the check-the-box line of
casesl92 - frame the parameters for application of this principle to tax
regulations. In Swallows Holding, the applicable statute provides that a
foreign corporation with income effectively connected with a U.S. trade or
business can claim deductions only by filing an income tax return in the
manner required by subtitle F of the Code, dealing with procedural rules.' 9 3
By amended regulations, Treasury prescribed that such a return had to be
filed by a specified time. 194
Taxpayers challenged the validity of the amended regulations. The full
Tax Court, with three judges dissenting, held the regulations invalid. The
187 E.g., J.W. Hampton, Jr. & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 406 (1928).
8 E.g., Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 415 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
18 E.g., FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 133 (2000); Indus.
Union Dep't, AFL-CIO v. Am. Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607, 685-87 (1980) (Rehnquist, J.,
concurring).
190 Cf Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 371-72 (1988) ("[W]e long have insisted that 'the
integrity and maintenance of the system of government ordained by the Constitution'
mandate that Congress generally cannot delegate its legislative power to another Branch.")
(quoting Field v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649, 692 (1892)).
191 Swallows Holding Ltd. v. Commissioner, 126 T.C. 96 (2006) (full-court reviewed),
rev'd, 515 F.3d 162 (3d Cir. 2008).
192 The first case of this line was Littreillo v. United States, 484 F.3d 372 (6th Cir.
2007), cert. denied, 552 U.S. 1186 (2008).
193 I.R.C. § 882(c)(2).
194 Treas. Reg. § 1.882-4(a)(2) (as amended in 2003).
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Third Circuit reversed and upheld the regulations.195 The Third Circuit was
right. When Congress requires that a return be filed, it obviously does not
intend that the filing can be made at any time before the end of the world.
That there will be some deadline is reasonably inferable from the statute.
The particular deadline is a matter of detail, and such line drawing is a
proper function for the agency.
In contrast, the check-the-box controversy involved a matter of first-
order significance, not mere detail. The Code prescribes different tax rules
and thus different tax liabilities depending on whether the entity conducting
the transactions is a corporation, partnership, or disregarded entity. Cases of
generations-old vintage established criteria by which entities would be
classified for tax purposes,196 and Treasury built on these cases in its
original entity-classification regulations.197
In 1997, however, Treasury promulgated new regulations - called the
"check the box" rules - that changed entity classification from a
mandatory regime based on defined criteria to a largely elective regime in
which many entities can choose how they will be taxed. 98
Commentators questioned the validity of the new regulations.199
Eventually, the matter was litigated in a series of cases. All of the cases
upheld the validity of the new regulations.200
These cases were wrongly decided because they ignored the "too big"
principle. Few matters are more significant to entity taxation than the
question of classification, and whether classification shall be mandatory or
elective is not a matter of mere detail. It is a fundamental choice freighted
with enormous revenue and regulatory consequences. An act of Congress,
not an act of an agency, should have been required to shift from a
mandatory to an elective system.
Unfortunately, the courts were never given the opportunity to consider
195 For discussion of Swallows Holding, see Johnson, supra note 30; Steve R. Johnson,
Swallows Holding as It Is: The Distortion ofNational Muffler, 112 TAX NOTES 351 (July 24,
2006).
196 E.g., Morrissey v. Commissioner, 296 U.S. 344 (1935); United States v. Kintner,
216 F.2d 418 (9th Cir. 1954).
197 Treas. Reg. §§ 301.7701-1 to -I1 (as amended in 1996).
198 Treas. Reg.§§ 301.7701-1 to -3 (as amended in 1997).
1 E.g., Brant J. Hellwig & Gregg L. Polsky, The Employment Tax Challenge to the
Check-the-Box Regulations, Ill TAX NOTES 1039 (May 29, 2006);Gregg D. Polsky, Can
Treasury Overrule the Supreme Court?, 84 B.U.L. REV. 185 (2004).
200 E.g., Kandi v. United States, 295 Fed. App'x 873 (9th Cir. 2008); McNamee v.
Dep't of Treasury, 488 F.3d 100 (2d Cir. 2007); L&L Holding Co., L.L.C. v. United States,
No. 05-0794-A, 2008 WL 1908840 (W.D. La. Apr. 30, 2008); Med. Practice Solutions,
LLC v. Commissioner, 132 T.C. 125 (2009), aff'd sub nom. Britton v. Shulman, 106
A.F.T.R.2d 2010-6048 (1st Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 2974 (2011).
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a "too big" objection to the check-the-box regulations. Taxpayers' counsel
did not raise the argument, presumably because counsel lacked experience
with administrative law principles.201 This line of cases illustrates the perils
of tax exceptionalism. Forcing taxpayers' counsel to find better arguments
than a distortion of National Muffler has the potential of improving
taxpayers' outcomes in litigation.
B. Procedural Arguments
The now discredited factors-based approach to National Muffler was in
large part a procedurally based argument. With this approach no longer
available, Mayo may compel taxpayers, and thus courts, to probe along
other procedural lines.
Treasury and the Service (the Department of Justice is more expert in
this regard) are not well-versed in general administrative law and
sometimes do not respond effectively to procedural challenges grounded in
such law. Accordingly, Judge Mark Holmes of the Tax Court has suggested
that if Mayo causes taxpayers to better press such challenges, Mayo may
result in taxpayers winning more often, not less often, when challenging
Service and Treasury positions.202 In turn, this may force Treasury and the
Service to become more sophisticated in administrative law, an eminently
desirable result.
Four procedural challenge possibilities are explored below. They are
(1) failure of regulations - including temporary regulations and allegedly
interpretive regulations - to go through the APA notice-and-comment
process; (2) failure of regulations to satisfy "hard look" review, including
failure to explain the reasons for choices made in the regulation; (3)
impermissible retroactivity; and (4) inappropriate reliance on the
AuerlSeminole Rock line of deference.
1. Notice and Comment
The APA prescribes that in order to promulgate binding rules (often
called legislative or substantive regulations), the agency must publish
general notice of its proposed rulemaking203 and must, before the rule
becomes effective, give interested persons the opportunity to submit
201 It would be too late to raise the "too big" argument now against the check-the-box
regulations. The validity of those regulations is now protected by a palisade of precedents.
202 Shamik Trivedi, Mayo Increases Taxpayer Chances of Success, Judge Says, 131
TAX NOTES 1319, 1319 (June 27, 2011).
203 5 U.S.C. § 553(b) (2012).
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comments.204 Excepted from this process are "interpretative rules, general
statements of policy, or rules of agency organization, procedure, or
practice" 205and situations in which "the agency for good cause finds (and
incorporates the finding and a brief statement of reasons there for in the
rules issued) that notice and public procedure thereon are impracticable,
unnecessary, or contrary to the public interest."206
Treasury usually submits tax regulations to this notice-and-comment
process. There is substantial reason to believe, however, that Treasury does
not always honor this obligation.207 This issue has been noted in a number
of recent tax cases,208 and it may be a useful argument in future cases.209
As noted in part V.B. above, Treasury and the Service sometimes have
attempted to avoid the notice-and-comment requirements on the ground that
general-authority regulations are interpretive and thus fall within an APA
exception. This position is spurious. Although the precise demarcation
between legislative and interpretive regulation is vigorously debated,210
general-authority tax regulations are legislative in character under the most
widely used tests211 and under the logic of Mayo.
Similarly, Treasury should not be able to routinely avoid notice and
comment when it issues temporary regulations.212 Congress anticipated and
204 5 U.S.C. § 553(c)-(d) (2012).
205 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(3)(A) (2012).
206 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(3)(B) (2012).
207 The pioneering work on this was done by Professor Hickman. Kristin E. Hickman, A
Problem of Remedy: Responding to Treasury's (Lack of) Compliance with Administrative
Procedure Act Rulemaking Requirements, 76 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1153 (2008); Kristin E.
Hickman, Coloring Outside the Lines: Examining Treasury's (Lack oj) Compliance with
Administrative Procedure Act Rulemaking Requirements, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 1727
(2007); see also Jasper L. Cummings, Jr., Treasury Violates the APA?, 117 TAx NOTEs 263
(Oct. 15, 2007); Amy S. Elliott, Panel Explores Noncompliance with Administrative
Procedure Act, 121 TAX NOTES 1141 (Dec. 8,2008).
208 E.g., Cohen v. United States, 650 F.3d 717, 721 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (noting taxpayers'
claim that a Notice, which attempted to create a binding rule, is invalid because it did not go
through notice and comment); Burks v. United States, 633 F.3d 347,360 n.9 (5th Cir. 2011);
Am. Standard, Inc. v. United States, 602 F.2d 256, 267-69 (Ct. Cl. 1979); Hosp. Corp. of
Am. v. Commissioner, 348 F.3d 136, 145 n.3 (6th Cir. 2003); Intermountain Ins. Serv. of
Vail, LLC v. Commissioner, 134 T.C. 211, 239, 245-47 (2010) (Halpern & Holmes, JJ.,
concurring), rev'd& remanded, 650 F.3d 691 (D.C. Cir. 2011).
209 See also Johnson, supra note 88, at 1554.
210 See supra notes 140 and 141 and accompanying text.
211 See Johnson, supra note 47, at 843-45 (discussing Am. Mining Cong. v. Mine
Safety & Health Admin., 995 F.2d 1106 (D.C. Cir. 1993), and other authorities).
212 See, e.g., Asimow, supra note 57; Juan F. Vasquez & Peter A. Lowy, Challenging
Temporary Treasury Regulations: An Analysis of the Administrative Procedure Act,
Legislative Reenactment Doctrine, Deference, and Invalidity, 3 Hous. Bus. & TAx L.J. 248,
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provided for situations in which expedited administrative action is
necessary. The APA "good cause" exception covers that terrain. If Treasury
can make out a convincing case of necessity, the exception would apply and
notice and comment could be properly omitted. Otherwise, temporary
regulations should go through the same process as any other tax regulation
seeking to establish binding law.213
2. "Hard Look" Review
The APA directs that a court reviewing an agency action "shall ...
hold unlawful and set aside agency action . .. found to be ... arbitrary,
capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with
law."2 14 "Arbitrary or capricious" did not originate with the APA. The
application of this standard by the courts has evolved dramatically.2 1 5
Before enactment of the APA, and even for some decades thereafter,
the standard was strikingly indulgent towards agencies.216 Although some
cases continue in this vein, contemporary "arbitrary or capricious" review
can be, and often is, quite searching. This heightened level of scrutiny has
become known as "hard look" review.217 Hard-look review has both
substantive and procedural aspects. Nonexclusively, the Supreme Court has
stated:
Normally, an agency rule would be arbitrary and capricious if the
agency has relied on factors which Congress has not intended it to
consider, entirely failed to consider an important aspect of the problem,
249-54 (2003).
213 Some taxpayers' representatives have expressed the fear that forcing Treasury to
follow the APA process would interfere with the government's ability to issue pro-taxpayer
regulations and to provide needed clarifications. I believe this fear is groundless. See Steve
R. Johnson, Following the APA Will Not Eliminate Useful Guidance, 130 TAX NOTES
128,128 (Jan. 3, 2011).
214 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (2012).
215 The evolution is traced in RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 81-86
(2008).
216 Pac. States Box & Basket Co. v. White, 296 U.S. 176, 185 (1935) ("[1]f any state of
facts reasonably can be conceived that would sustain [the agency's action], there is a
presumption of the existence of that state of facts, and one who assails the classification must
carry the burden of showing ... that the action is arbitrary.") (quoting Borden's Farm Prods.
Co..v. Baldwin, 293 U.S. 194, 209 (1934)).
217 The reviewing court will invalidate the agency action if it "becomes aware,
especially from a combination of danger signals, that the agency has not really taken a 'hard
look' at the salient problems, and has not genuinely engaged in reasoned decision-
making."Greater Boston Television Corp. v. FCC, 444 F.2d 841, 850 (D.C. Cir. 1970)
(Leventhal, J., writing for the court).
2012] 309
Virginia Tax Review [Vol. 32:269
offered an explanation for its decision that runs counter to the evidence
before the agency, or is so implausible that it could not be ascribed to a
difference in view or the product of agency expertise. 218
Substantively, an agency action must meet a test of rationality. This
applies to tax regulations as fully as to other types of regulations. Cases
invalidating Treasury regulations are studded with variations on this
theme.2 19
One procedural aspect of hard-look review is a duty of explanation. An
agency "must cogently explain why it has exercised its discretion in a given
manner.",220 This duty was emphasized in the Supreme Court's recent
Judulang decision:
Agencies ... have expertise and experience in administering their
statutes that no court can properly ignore. But courts retain a role,
and an important one, in ensuring that agencies have engaged in
reasoned decisionmaking.. .. That task involves examining the
reasons for agency decisions - or, as the case may be, the absence
of such reasons.221
Notices of proposed rulemaking and preambles to proposed and final
regulations are the principal places where Treasury explains the choices it
made in its regulations.222 If these and other sources fail in the task of
218 Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43
(1983).
219 E.g., Prof I Equities, Inc. v. Commissioner, 89 T.C. 165, 175 (1987) (stating that the
method by which the regulation sought to accomplish its goal "is virtually
incomprehensible"); Estate of Bullard v. Commissioner, 87 T.C. 261, 281 (1986) (noting
that the Service "has not raised, nor [have we] discovered, a single rational basis" for its rule,
and that the rule "cannot be applied in an arbitrary manner"); Apis Prods., Inc. v.
Commissioner, 86 T.C. 1192, 1201 (1986) (finding that the regulation "lacks any rational
basis" and reflects "arbitrariness").
220 Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n., 463 U.S. at 48; see also FCC v. Fox Television Stations,
Inc., 556 U.S. 502 (2009); Adamo Wrecking Co. v. United States, 434 U.S. 275, 289 n.5
(1978); Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 (1971); SEC v.
Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194 (1947); SEC v. Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80 (1943).
221 Judulang v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 476, 483-84 (2011).
222 Depending on the court, statements in these documents may have interpretive
weight. Some courts have found them helpful, especially in clarifying ambiguities in the
regulation. E.g., Nalle v. Commissioner, 997 F.2d 1134, 1140 n.7 (5th Cir. 1993); Texasgulf,
Inc. v. United States, 17 Cl. Ct. 275, 281 (1989); Armco, Inc. v. Commissioner, 87 T.C. 865,
868-69 (1986); see also I.R.S. Tech. Adv. Mem. 91-33-006 (Aug. 16, 1991). Other courts,
however, have found such documents to be entitled to little weight. E.g., Allen v.
Commissioner, 118 T.C. 1, 12 (2002); Dobin v. Commissioner, 73 T.C. 1121, 1127 n.9
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explanation, taxpayers may challenge the validity of the regulation in
question. A body of commentary has developed in this regard.223 Some
older cases have noted the issue,224 and it has appeared even more
frequently in recent cases.225
3. Retroactivity
One prominent tax commentator believes that the APA prohibits
Treasury from promulgating regulations with retroactive effect.226 Under
current Code section 7805(b), it is difficult to see how that is so. No court
has expressed that view, and I doubt that any court will in the future.
Clearly, improper retroactivity is a viable argument in certain cases. As
noted in part V.B.3., the 1996 changes to section 7805(b) were motivated
by a desire to restrict Treasury's use of retroactivity. That is reflected in the
case law. Pre-1996 cases stressed that the prior version of the statute
"g[ave] the Commissioner broad discretion in delimiting the extent, if any,
to which a regulation will be retroactively applied." 2 2 7 The tone of the post-
1996 cases is strikingly different: "Generally, retroactive regulations are
prohibited, except under limited circumstances." 228
(1980), acq., 1980-82 C.B.I. See generally Sheldon I. Banoff & Richard R. Lipton,
Preambles to Regulations: Do They Count?, 109 J. TAX'N 63, 63 (2008).
223 E.g., Johnson, supra note 88, at 1555-56; Patrick J. Smith, The APA 's Reasoned-
Explanation Rule and IRS Deficiency Notices, 134 TAX NOTES 331, 331 (Jan. 16, 2012);
Patrick J. Smith, Mayo and Chenery: Too Much of a Shift in Rationale?, 129 TAx NOTES
454, 454 (Oct. 25, 2010); Patrick J. Smith, Omissions from Gross Income and the Chenery
Rule, 128TAx NOTEs 763, 763 (Aug. 16, 2010).
224 E.g., Am. Standard, Inc. v. United States, 602 F.2d 256 (Ct. Cl. 1979); Ga. Fed.
Bank, F.S.B. v. Commissioner, 98 T.C. 105 (1992); but cf United States v. Vogel Fertilizer
Co., 455 U.S. 16 (1982) (invalidating a tax regulation, noting that it was inconsistent with
the explanation which Treasury had given when it advocated the statutory change).
225 E.g., Mannella v. Commissioner, 631 F.3d 115, 127 (3d Cir. 2011) (Ambro, J.,
dissenting); Dominion Res,, Inc. v. United States, 97 Fed. Cl. 239, 258-59 (2011), rev'd, 681
F.3d 1313 (Fed. Cir. 2012); Carpenter Family Inv., LLC v. Commissioner, 136 T.C. 373,
395-96 (2011).
226 Coder, supra note 6, at 1230 (reporting remarks of Irving Salem); see also Bowen v.
Georgetown Univ. Hosp., 488 U.S. 204, 217 (1988) (Scalia, J., concurring) (appearing to
suggest that, under the APA, rules cannot be retroactive).
227 Likins-Foster Honolulu Corp. v. Commissioner, 840 F.2d 642, 647 (9th Cir. 1988).
These cases also recognized, however, that retroactive application of a Treasury regulation
could be an abuse of discretion if it produced an unduly harsh result and that reasonable
reliance on prior law could be evidence of such a result. E.g., Redhouse v. Commissioner,
728 F.2d 1249, 1252 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1034 (1984).
228 Marriott Int'l Resorts, L.P. v. United States, 83 Fed. Cl. 291, 303 (2008), aff'd, 586
F.3d 962 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
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Just how binding the section 7805(e) strictures are, however, is not yet
clear. The case law is not yet well developed. Consider three examples of
the lack of clarity. The first involves the effective date of the 1996 changes.
The statute provides that they are effective "with respect to regulations
which relate to statutory provisions enacted on or after [June 30, 1996]." 229
This seemingly straightforward language conceals difficulties, however. For
example, what if the statute was enacted before June 30, 1996, but
significantly amended after that date and the regulations deal with the
amendment? The case law thus far has split on effective date questions.230
The second example involves definition. When is a change retroactive?
How important are the following factors in answering that question: the
degree to which prior law was settled, whether the taxpayer's conduct had
already occurred, whether the taxpayer's return had already been filed, and
other situation-specific circumstances? The parties in the Home Concrete
case disagreed as to whether the changes to the section 6501(e) regulations
are retroactive.231 Unfortunately, the Supreme Court's decision in that case
did not resolve the question. Deciding the case on other grounds, the
Supreme Court majority avoided the retroactivity issue.232
The third example involves the exceptions in section 7805(b). Will the
general prohibition of retroactivity in section 7805(b)(1) be swallowed by
the exceptions in section 7805(b)(2) to (6)? This question is particularly
acute as to section 7805(b)(3), which authorizes Treasury to "provide that
any regulation may take effect or apply retroactively to prevent abuse."
Whether a given return reporting position constitutes an "abuse" has an
"eye of the beholder" quality. In part IV.C. above, we saw that the
government has sometimes taken arguably overly aggressive positions,
especially in its efforts to combat tax shelters. It would not be astounding to
see a similar tack taken, at some point in the future, under section
7805(b)(3).
Although there were exceptions, it used to be the policy of Treasury
229 Taxpayer Bill of Rights 2, Pub .L. No. 104-168, § 1101(b), 110 Stat. 1452, 1468-69
(1996).
230 Compare Grapevine Imports, Ltd. v. United States, 636 F.3d 1368, 1381 n.6 (Fed.
Cir. 2011), with Murfam Farms, LLC. v. United States, 88 Fed. Cl. 516 (2009).
231 Compare Brief for the United States, supra note 162, at 12, with Brief for
Respondents at 45-48, United States v. Home Concrete & Supply, LLC, 132 S. Ct. 1836
(2012) (No. 1 1-139). See generallv William V. Luneberg, Retroactivity and Administrative
Rulemaking, 1991 DUKE L.J. 106, 156-57 (defining and classifying types of retroactivity).
232 The dissent did address the issue briefly. It maintained that the regulation clarified
an ambiguous statute, thus "did not upset legitimate settled expectations. . . Having worked
no change in the law, and instead having interpreted a statutory provision without an
established meaning, the ... regulation does not have an impermissible retroactive effect."
Home Concrete, 132 S. Ct. at 1853 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
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and the Service "to exercise the discretion granted under Section 7805(b) by
making any changes in Regulations which would act to the detriment of the
taxpayer prospective. [But] changes in Regulations benefiting the taxpayer
have generally been applied retroactively to all open years."233 A similar
policy would serve tax administration well under the current version of the
statute.
4. Auer/Seminole Rock
Part V.B described Auer/Seminole Rock deference and how it increases
the opportunity for strategic and possibly abusive agency behavior. Even
under existing doctrine, there are available arguments by which that danger
may be addressed. More fundamentally, however, I believe that
Auer/Seminole Rock is a game not worth the candle. These cases should be
abrogated.
a. Arguments Within Existing Doctrine
Despite the Supreme Court's general adherence to Auer and Seminole
Rock, the Court has recognized limitations on their reach. In a situation of
potential Service overreaching, one or another of these limitations may be
found to exist.
There are at least four recognized exceptions or limitations. First, Auer
deference will not be extended if the underlying regulation is
unambiguous.234 Thus, the Service should not be able to obtain greater
deference by striving to make unclear what is a clear Treasury regulation.235
Second, Auer deference will not be accorded if the agency's
interpretation is "plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation."236
The same result would also obtain, of course, if the interpretation is
inconsistent with the statute under which the regulation was
promulgated.237
Third, Auer deference will be withheld if it appears that deferring to the
agency would effectively permit it, "under the guise of interpreting a
regulation, to create de facto a new regulation.',238 Thus, Auer cannot be
used to circumvent the notice-and-comment process.
233 Rogovin, supra note 117, at 762-63.
234 E.g., Christensen v. Harris Cnty., 529 U.S. 576, 588 (2000).
235 See, e.g., discussion of Estate ofPetter, infra Part VI.D.
236 Talk Am., Inc. v. Mich. Bell Tel. Co., 131 S. Ct. 2254, 2261 (2011) (quoting Chase
Bank USA, N.A. v. McCoy, 131 S. Ct. 871, 880 (2011)).
237 See infra Part VI.C.I.
238 Talk Am.,131 S. Ct. at 2263 (quoting Christensen, 529 U.S. at 588).
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Fourth, Auer deference will not be accorded if there is "reason to
suspect that the interpretation does not reflect the agency's fair and
considered judgment on the matter in question." 239 For example, a mere
"post hoc rationalization" created as part of an agency's litigation position
does not constitute "fair and considered judgment."240 Additionally, the
agency's lack of consistency in interpreting the regulation over time may
bear on this exception.241 As discussed in part II.A. 1. above, Mayo rejected
such considerations in assessing whether a tax regulation properly
implements the statute. However, they apparently remain viable factors in
deciding whether the Service properly interprets an ambiguous Treasury
regulation.2 42
b. Abrogation
Skillful use of the exceptions described above may or may not suffice
to prevent government overreaching via AuerlSeminole Rock in the era of
Mayo. This is a risk we need not take. AuerlSeminole Rock is misguided,
and this variety of deference should be discarded.
Various rationales have been offered in support of Auer/Seminole Rock
deference. The most common is that the agency that wrote the ambiguous
regulation best understands what it was trying to say.243 Another is that
agencies apply their interpretations over numerous cases, only a small
percentage of which are litigated.244 For courts to disturb the agency's
settled position in the cases they hear could undermine uniform application
of law.245 Finally, courts should respect the role agencies play in our system
of government. 246
239 Talk Am., 131 S. Ct. at 2263 (quoting Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 462 (1997));
Chase Bank, 131 S. Ct. at 881 (quoting Auer, 519 U.S. at 462); Auer, 519 U.S. at 462. See
also Burlington Truck Lines, Inc. v. United States, 371 U.S. 156, 168-69 (1962); SEC v.
Chenery, 332 U.S. 194, 196-197 (1947).
240 Talk Am., 131 S. Ct. at 2263; Chase Bank, 131 S Ct. at 881; Auer, 519 U.S. at 462;
Burlington, 371 U.S. at 168; Chenery, 332 U.S. at 196-197.
241 Chase Bank, 131 S. Ct. at 881 (noting that the agency's current position was
"entirely consistent with its past views").
242 See Lipton & Young, supra note 7, at 214. See generally Sedo & Wessbecker, supra
note 143.
243 E.g., Abbott Lab. v. United States, 573 F.3d 1327, 1330 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (quoting
Cathedral Candle Co. v. U.S. Int'l Trade Comm'n, 400 F.3d 1352, 1363-64 (Fed.Cir.2005)).
244 See Deference to Agencies' Interpretations, supra note 130, at 666; see also
Auer/Seminole Rock Deference, supra note 130.
245 E.g., French v. D.C. Bd. of Zoning Adjustment, 658 A.2d 1023, 1033 (D.C. App.
1995).
246 However, courts have their responsibilities also. So, "balancing the necessary
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There is something to these rationales, of course. However, when
Treasury creates the problem by writing an ambiguous regulation, it is
strange to reward it by according unusual deference to the Service's
interpretation of the regulation. In my view, the arguments against the
Auer/Seminole Rock regime described in part II.V.C. are stronger than the
arguments for it.
Heartening in this regard is Justice Scalia's recent conversion in the
Talk America case.247 His argument against Auer/Seminole Rock proceeds
as follows: In the Chevron context, when Congress enacts an imprecise
statute, it commits the power of implementation to an agency. Thus, "[t]he
legislative and executive functions are not combined." 248 In contrast, "when
an agency promulgates an imprecise rule, it leaves to itself the
implementation of that rule .... It seems contrary to fundamental principles
of separation of powers to permit the person who promulgates a law to
interpret it as well." 249 Specifically,
[d]eferring to an agency's interpretation of a statute does not
encourage Congress, out of a desire to expand its power, to enact
vague statutes; the vagueness effectively cedes power to the
Executive. By contrast, deferring to an agency's interpretation of
its own rule encourages the agency to enact vague rules which give
it power, in future adjudications, to do what it pleases. This
frustrates the notice and predictability purposes of rulemaking and
promotes arbitrary government.250
5. Regulatory Flexibility Act
The Regulatory Flexibility Act ("RFA") was enacted to minimize
unnecessary burdens on small businesses in complying with federal
regulations. In general, and subject to exceptions, the RFA requires
agencies to prepare initial and final regulatory economic analyses of the
potential negative effects on small businesses of new rules promulgated by
.251
agencies.
respect for an agency's knowledge, expertise, and constitutional office with the courts' role
as interpreter of laws can be a delicate matter." Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243, 255
(2006).
247 Talk Am.,131 S. Ct. at 2266 (Scalia, J., concurring) ("While I have in the past
uncritically accepted [the Auer] rule, I have become increasingly doubtful of its validity.").
248 Id.
249 Id. (emphasis in original).
250 Id
251 5 U.S.C. §§ 603-604 (2012).
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RFA requirements as to tax regulations are set out in Code section
7805(f). Treasury commonly includes RFA analyses (or explanations of
why RFA analyses are not required) in the Treasury decisions that
accompany proposed and final regulations. 252
RFA challenges have been brought in many administrative law
contexts.253 However, RFA challenges are rarely brought against tax
regulations. Nonetheless, it is not clear that Treasury takes RFA analysis
seriously as part of the process of promulgating regulations. There may be
room to develop RFA arguments in some cases.254
C. Substantive Arguments
Substantive attacks have for generations been mainstays of challenges
to Treasury and Service positions. Nothing in Mayo diminishes their
availability. Below, I address substantive attacks on regulations, then argue
that sub-regulation Service guidance documents - which, of course, are
potentially subject to similar substantive challenges - typically should not
receive Chevron deference as a result of Mayo.
1. Regulations
Treasury regulations have been invalidated on many substantive
grounds, including their being inconsistent with the text or structure of the
applicable Code section, inconsistent with the purposes behind the section,
and inconsistent with other sources of legal norms extrinsic to the particular
Code section. Such attacks remain available under Mayo.
a. Inconsistent with Statutory Text or Structure
When the text of a statute is clear, there is no need for resort to other
indicia of meaning.255 Thus, when available, the natural starting point for
252 See, e.g., Hosp. Corp. of Am. v. Commissioner, 348 F.3d 136, 144 (6th Cir. 2004)
(noting Treasury's conclusion that the temporary regulation under review did not require
RFA analysis), cert. denied, 543 U.S. 813 (2004).
253 E.g., Small Bus. in Telecomm. v. FCC, 251 F.3d 1015, 1025-26 (D.C. Cir. 2001);
Mid-Tex Elec. Coop., Inc. v. FERC, 773 F.2d 327, 340-43 (D.C. Cir. 1985); Thompson v.
Clark, 741 F.2d 401 (D.C. Cir. 1984); Harlan Land Co. v. USDA, 186 F. Supp. 2d 1076,
1096-97 (E.D. Cal. 2001); N.C. Fisheries Ass'n, Inc. v. Daley, 16 F. Supp. 2d 647, 651
(E.D. Va. 1997).
254 See, e.g., Asimow, supra note 57, at 345, 360-72; Moore, supra note 57.
255 E.g., Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Servs., Inc., 545 U.S. 546, 568 (2005); Blum
v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 896 (1984); Consumer Prod. Safety Comm'n v. GTE Sylvania,
Inc., 447 U.S. 102, 108 (1980).
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attack on a regulation is that the regulation is contrary to the text of the
Code section under which it has been promulgated. A number of cases have
found tax regulations to be incompatible with the "plain meaning" of a
Code section.256
"Plain meaning" is not ascertained from the statutory language in
isolation. It is a "fundamental canon of statutory construction that the words
of a statute must be read in their context and with a view to their place in
the overall statutory scheme."257 Plain meaning also may be found in a
statutory term reflecting a technical, industry understanding of a statutory
term rather than common usage.2
Similarly, Chevron taught that the meaning of a statute is ascertained
with regard to "the traditional tools of statutory construction."259 Those
tools include the various canons of construction. In several cases, such
canons have helped persuade courts that a tax regulation was inconsistent
with the statutory text or structure. 260
b. Inconsistent with Statutory Purpose
Statutory purpose is the great constructional counterweight to statutory
text.261 Thus, tax regulations often have been invalidated because they ran
256 E.g., United States v. Vogel Fertilizer Co., 455 U.S. 16(1982); Rowan Co., Inc. v.
United States, 452 U.S. 247 (1982); Commissioner v. Standard Life & Accident Ins. Co.,
433 U.S. 148 (1977); Ne. Pa. Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. United States, 387 U.S. 213, 221-22
(1967). Cf Manhattan Gen. Equip. Co. v. Commissioner, 297 U.S. 129, 134 (1936) ("A
regulation .. . operates to create a rule out of harmony with the statute, is a mere nullity.").
257 Davis v. Mich. Dep't of Treasury, 489 U.S. 803, 809 (1989). See also O'Gilvie v.
United States, 519 U.S. 79, 95 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting); Brown v. Gardner, 513 U.S.
115, 118 (1994); United States v. Morton, 467 U.S. 822, 828 (1984); Helvering v. Gregory,
69 F.2d 809, 810-11 (2d Cir. 1934) ("[T]he meaning of a sentence may be more than that of
the separate words, as a melody is more than the notes . . . ."), aff'd, 293 U.S. 465 (1935).
258 E.g., W. Nat'l Mut. Ins. Co. v. Commissioner, 65 F.3d 90, 93 (8th Cir. 1995)
(invalidating an income tax regulation), abrogated by AtI. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Commissioner,
523 U.S. 382 (1998); Mass. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. United States, 103 Fed. Cl. 111, 156
(2012).
259 Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843 n.9
(1984).
260 E.g., Microsoft Corp. v. Commissioner, 311 F.3d 1178, 1184-85 (9th Cir. 2002)
(deploying the noscitur a sociis canon); Goodson-Todman Enters., Ltd. v. Commissioner,
784 F.2d 66, 76 (2d Cir. 1986) (ejusdem generis canon).
261 "[I]t is one of the surest indexes of a mature and developed jurisprudence not to
make a fortress out of the dictionary; but to remember that statutes always have some
purpose or object to accomplish, whose sympathetic and imaginative discovery is the surest




counter to the statutory purpose, frequently a purpose revealed by the
legislative history.262
It is a matter of some debate where, under Mayo and other cases,
purpose fits in the Chevron analysis. Does it come in at step one, step two,
or not at all? The question is unsettled and, in my opinion, will remain so.
There is no grand doctrinal evolution at work here. Whether purpose
(and especially legislative history as indicative of purpose) is considered at
all and, if so, whether it appears as part of the step one or step two analysis
depends on nothing more than the statutory construction proclivity of the
judge or justice who happens to write the particular decision.
Chief Justice Roberts, a textualist, wrote the Mayo opinion, so
unsurprisingly the step one analysis in Mayo is constrained in scope, with
principal attention paid to the language of the statute.263 This is similar to
Justice Thomas's opinion for the Court in Brand 2 64 and Justice Scalia's
dissent in Regions Hospital.265
In contrast, purpose and legislative history are likely to be considered
at step one when the opinion is written by a purposive judge or justice, as
happened in Justice Stevens' opinion for the Court in Chevron itself266and,
subsequently, in Justice Ginsburg's opinion for the Court in Regions
Hospital.267 In short, the pendulum will continue to swing in future cases as
to the role of purpose and legislative history, depending on the
interpretational ideology of the author of each new opinion.
c. Inconsistent with Extrinsic Norms
It is widely accepted that courts should interpret laws, as far as text
permits, to fit them "most logically and comfortably into the body of both
previously and subsequently enacted law." 268 The key question is what is
262 E.g., United States v. Vogel Fertilizer Co., 455 U.S. 16 (1982); Rowan Cos., Inc. v.
United States, 452 U.S. 247 (1981); Ann Jackson Family Found. v. Commissioner, 15 F.3d
917, 921 (9th Cir. 1994); Walt Disney Prod. v. United States, 480 F.2d 66 (9th Cir. 1973).
263 Mayo v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 704, 711 (2011).
264 Nat'l Cable & Telecomm. Ass'n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 989
(2005) (performing the step one analysis by reference to the statute's "plain terms").
265 Regions Hosp. v. Shalala, 522 U.S. 448, 464-69 (1998) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
266 Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 852-853
(1984).
267 Regions Hosp., 522 U.S. at 460-61.
268 W. Va. Univ. Hosps., Inc. v. Casey, 499 U.S. 83, 100 (1991); see also FDA v.
Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 133 (2000) (noting "[t]he classic
judicial task of reconciling many laws enacted over time, and getting them to 'make sense'
in combination" (quoting United States v. Fausto, 484 U.S. 439, 453 (1988))); Vt. Agency of
Natural Res. v. United States ex rel. Stevens, 529 U.S. 765, 786 n.17 (2000) ("[I]t is well
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included in the relevant surrounding legal context. As seen below, tax
regulations have been invalidated when found to be inconsistent with a
variety of sources extrinsic to the particular Code section under which the
regulation was promulgated.
First, regulations have been invalidated or interpreted adversely to the
Service for being in conflict with other, already extant parts of the tax laws.
These include Code sections other than the section under which the
regulation was issued,269tax treaties to which the United States is a party, 270
and previous, but still effective, Treasury regulations. 271
Second, tax regulations have been invalidated for being in tension with
non-tax statutes. For example, in Cartwright, the Supreme Court
invalidated an estate tax regulation under Code section 2031.272 The Court
acknowledged that the challenged regulation was "not, on its face,
technically inconsistent with [the statute]," but it concluded that the
government's position was "unrealistic and unreasonable." In significant
part, the Court was moved by perceived inconsistency between the
regulation and a non-tax statute. The Court remarked that the regulation "is
manifestly inconsistent with the most elementary provisions of the
Investment Company Act of 1940 and operates without regard for the
market in mutual fund shares that the Act created and regulates.",
2 7 3
Third, regulations have been invalidated for incompatibility with the
Constitution. Violation of an express constitutional provision obviously
would be fatal. Even when no express provision is traduced, the regulation
can fall if it is in tension with constitutional values. For example, in one
case, the court invalidated a regulation under Code section 103 dealing with
arbitrage as to tax-exempt state and local bonds because the regulation was
seen to be incompatible with the principle of federalism.274 Even if the
regulation escapes outright invalidation, it may be given a limiting
established that a court can, and should, interpret the text of one statute in the light of
surrounding statutes. . . ."); Steve R. Johnson, Supertext and Consistent Meaning, 52 ST.
TAX NOTES 675 (May 25, 2009).
269 E.g., Cottage Say. Ass'n v. Commissioner, 499 U.S. 554, 566 (1991); Minahan v.
Commissioner, 88 T.C. 492, 505-06 (1987).
270 Nat'l Westminster Bank, PLC v. United States, 44 Fed. Cl. 120 (1990), af'd, 512
F.3d 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
271 E.g., St. Jude Med., Inc. v. Commissioner, 34 F.3d 1394, 1402 (8th Cir. 1994).
272 United States v. Cartwright, 411 U.S. 546 (1973).
273 Id. at 557, 550.
274 Wash. v. Commissioner, 692 F.2d 128, 136 (D.C. Cir. 1982) ("Since these
regulations restrict the freedom of states and municipalities to invest the proceeds of their




construction on account of constitutional tension.275
Mayo lends support to the idea that compatibility with extrinsic sources
of legal norms is relevant to the Chevron analysis of the validity of tax
regulations. Step two directs a reviewing court to determine whether the
challenged regulation is reasonable. How wide is that angle of vision? Is the
court to confine the reasonableness inquiry to only what bears on the
fidelity of the regulation to the statutory provision, or may the court also
consider extrinsic factors?
Mayo takes the second road. It included administrability- an extrinsic
norm - as part of its step two analysis.276 Although some have seen
retrenchment from that view in a post-Mayo case,277 I believe that Mayo is
correct in this regard.278 Mayo sanctions a broad look at reasonableness,
which keeps the door open to taxpayers, in appropriate cases, to make the
"inconsistent with extrinsic norms" arguments described above.
2. Sub-Regulation Positions
In my view, Service guidance documents - including revenue rulings,
revenue procedures, and the array of other media - should be treated as
nonbinding and, when challenged, should be tested under Skidmore, not
Chevron. Doing so will draw a bright line in an area in need of clarity and
will prevent circumvention of restrictions on legislative regulations.
There have been a few decisions that have afforded Chevron treatment
275 Under the "avoidance canon," a statute will be interpreted, if fairly possible, so as to
avoid a serious constitutional question. E.g., Solid Waste Agency of N. Cook Cnty. v. United
States Army Corps of Eng'rs, 531 U.S. 159 (2001).Similarly, under the "plain statement"
principle, when a statute appears to be in tension with constitutional values, the courts often
insist that Congress has made "its intention unmistakably clear in the language of the
statute."Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 242 (1985); see also Gregory v.
Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 460, 464 (1991); Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451
U.S. 1, 17, 23 (1981).
276 Mayo Found. for Med. Educ. & Research v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 704, 715
(2011) (finding the regulation reasonable in part because it diminishes "wasteful litigation
and continuing uncertainty" (quoting United States v. Correll, 389 U.S. 299, 302 (1967))).
277 See Salem, supra note 81 (discussing Judulang v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 476 (2011)).
But Judulang, although it does not give it dispositive significance, does acknowledge that
administrability is relevant. See 132 S. Ct. at 490 ("[C]ost is an important factor for agencies
to consider in many contexts. But cheapness alone cannot save an arbitrary agency policy").
27s Considering administrability at step two is consistent with the preponderance of the
case law. See, e.g., Coeur Alaska, Inc. v. Se. Alaska Conservation Council, 557 U.S. 261,
295 (Scalia, J., concurring); Dickow v. United States, 654 F.3d 144, 150-51 (1st Cir. 2011);
Lantz v. Commissioner, 607 F.3d 479, 485 (7th Cir. 2010); Barahona v. Napolitano, No. 10
Civ. 1574(SAS), 2011 WL 4840716, at *Il (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 11, 2011).
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to sub-regulation Service guidance documents.279 Moreover, there has been
a larger number of decisions that have treated the matter as unresolved, that
is, have held open the possibility of Chevron treatment for such Service
positions.280
Nonetheless, the great bulk of the case law holds that revenue rulings
and other sub-regulation Service positions are tested under Skidmore or
some other weak standard, not under Chevron.281 There is good reason for
this. Revenue rulings are generally acknowledged to be the Service
guidance documents next in rank after Treasury Regulations. The Service
says this about its revenue rulings:
(d) Revenue rulings . . . do not have the force and effect of
Treasury Department Regulations.. . but are published to provide
precedents to be used in the disposition of other cases, and may be
cited and relied upon for that purpose ....
(e) Taxpayers may generally rely upon Revenue Rulings ... in
determining the tax treatment of their own transactions ....
However, since each Revenue Ruling represents the conclusion of
the Service as to the application of the law to the entire state of
facts involved, taxpayers, Service personnel, and others concerned
are cautioned against reaching the same conclusion in other cases
unless the facts and circumstances are substantially the same. They
should consider the effect of subsequent legislation, regulations,
court decisions, and revenue rulings.282
Thus, revenue rulings do not have the force of law.283 They are
situation specific, not of general application.284 They may be relied upon
279 E.g., Ammex, Inc. v. United States, No. 00-CV-73388, 2002 WL 32065583 (E.D.
Mich. July 31, 2002), abrogated by, Ammex, Inc. v. United States, No. 00-CV-73388, 2002
WL 31777584 (E.D. Mich. Oct. 22, 2002).
280 E.g., Bluetooth Sig Inc. v. United States, 611 F.3d 617, 622 (9th Cir. 2010) (stating
that revenue rulings "are entitled to at least Skidmore deference") (emphasis added);
Tualatin Valley Builders Supply, Inc. v. United States, 522 F.3d 937, 941 (9th Cir. 2008)
("Our case law leaves unresolved the question whether a revenue procedure should receive
Chevron or Skidmore deference."); Fed. Nat'l Mortg. Ass'n v. United States, 379 F.3d 1303,
1308 (Fed. Cir. 2004); Am. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. United States, 267 F.3d 1344, 1352 n.3
(Fed. Cir. 2001).
281 E.g., Aeroquip-Vickers, Inc. v. Commissioner, 347 F.3d 173 (6th Cir. 2003);
Omohundro v. United States, 300 F.3d 1065, 1069 (9th Cir. 2001).
282 I.R.S. Proc. Regs. § 601.601(d)-(e).
283 E.g., Anders v. Commissioner, 48 T.C. 815, 821 (1967).
284 The APA defines a "rule" as "an agency statement of general or particular
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only "generally,"285 and whatever authority they may once have possessed
may evanesce as a result of subsequent developments. They typically are
issued without notice and comment, and they are not approved by the
Secretary of the Treasury.286 In short, sub-regulation guidance from the
Service does not make binding law.
The thoughtful ABA Deference Report concluded that rulings and the
like should not be Chevron-entitled.287 The current policy of the
Department of Justice, reversing an earlier position,288 is not to argue that
such Service guidance documents are within the Chevron ambit. 289I my
view, this is a sound position and should become settled law.
D. Construction Arguments
The preceding classes of arguments seek to curtail administrative
overreaching by achieving invalidation of allegedly improper regulations.
But there is another possible path. Instead of winning by invalidating a
regulation, taxpayers may sometimes be able to prevail by persuading the
court to interpret the regulation in a favorable fashion. This is similar to the
process by which the nondelegation doctrine morphed from a constitutional
.290
rule to a principle of statutory interpretation.
In the past, taxpayers sometimes have succeeded in persuading courts
to interpret Treasury regulations adversely to the Service. In one respect,
applicability and future effect designed to implement, interpret, or prescribe law or policy."5
U.S.C. § 551(4) (2012). Revenue rulings are "rules" within the broadest sense of that
definition.
285 In fact, although the Service strives to achieve positional consistency, it happens
with some frequency that the Service takes a position in a particular case that is inconsistent
with a prior, published revenue ruling or other sub-regulation guidance document. See Steve
R. Johnson, An IRS Duty of Consistency: The Failure of Common Law Making and a
Proposed Legislative Solution,77 TENN. L. REv. 563, 565-70 (2010). A leading
administrative law scholar of his day stated: "Of all the agencies of the government, the
worst offender against sound principles in the use of precedents may be the Internal Revenue
Service." 2 KENNETH CULP DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 8.12 (2d ed. 1979).
286 Limited, Inc. v. Commissioner, 286 F.3d 324, 337 (6th Cir. 2002).
287 Salem, Aprill & Galler, supra note 143, at 769-72.
288 See Jeremiah Coder, Officials Comment on Interpreting Mayo, 2011 TNT 16-4 (Jan.
25, 2011) (quoting acting Deputy Assistant Attorney General Gilbert Rothenberg as saying
that "DOJ believes that even revenue rulings should be subject to Chevron deference.").
289 See Marie Sapirie, DOJ Won't Argue for Chevron Deference for Revenue Rulings
and Procedures, Official Says, 2011 TNT 90-7 (May 10, 2011) (citing Mr. Rothenberg as
saying that "[t]he Department of Justice will no longer argue for Chevron deference for
revenue rulings and revenue procedures").
290 See ALFRED C. AMAN, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND PROCESS 547 (2d ed. 2006).
291 E.g., Cottage Say. Ass'n v. Commissioner, 499 U.S. 554, 562-66 (1991) (income
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Mayo fortifies such efforts. Tax is overwhelmingly statutory, so nearly all
tax cases ultimately are events of statutory construction. Statutory
construction in American courts involves perpetual conflict between (or,
more accurately, ever-shifting balances of) textual and purposive
interpretational approaches.292 Principles developed in construing statutes
also have been applied to construing regulations.293
Mayo noted that in a previous case the Court had "expressly invited the
Treasury Department to 'amend its regulations' if troubled by the
consequences of our resolution of the case."294 This aspect of Mayo can be
deployed in support of textual construction limiting the reach of a tax
regulation.
This was done in Estate of Petter, a 2011 Ninth Circuit case.295 The
court confronted a controversy as to a federal gift tax regulation. In an
opinion authored by a textually inclined judge, the court gave the regulation
a restrictive, literal interpretation and held for the taxpayer. The court
concluded its analysis by quoting the above language of Mayo.296
What was done in Estate of Petter could be done in other tax cases in
the future. Thus, Mayo may give support to textually oriented construction
that limits the reach of tax regulations.
E. Summary
Part V showed how Mayo, if aggressively used by Treasury and the
Service in conjunction with other rules and principles, could present the
potential of governmental overreaching. While we need to be vigilant
against that danger, this part has demonstrated that ample doctrinal
resources remain after Mayo to meet this challenge.
Under existing doctrine (or, in some cases, existing doctrine with fairly
modest adjustment), many avenues exist by which abusive regulations can
tax regulation); cf Commissioner v. Estate of Hubert, 520 U.S. 93 (1997) (Supreme Court
severely split on interpretation of estate tax regulation).
292 See, e.g., WILLIAM N. ESICRIDGE, JR., PHILIP P. FRICKEY & ELIZABETH GARRETT,
LEGISLATION AND STATUTORY INTERPRETATION chs. 6-9 (2d ed. 2006);Steve R. Johnson, The
Two Kinds of Legislative Intent, 51 ST. TAX NOTES 1045 (Mar. 30, 2009); Steve R. Johnson,
The Use and Abuse ofPlain Meaning Doctrine, 49 ST. TAX NOTES 831 (Sept. 22, 2008).
293 Examples of cases citing Mayo and construing tax regulations include Goodrich
Corp. v. United States, 846 F. Supp. 2d 445, 449 (W.D.N.C. 2012), and Ambase Corp. v.
United States, 834 F. Supp. 2d 71, 74-76 (D. Conn. 2011).
294 Mayo Found. for Med. Educ. & Research v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 704, 713
(2011) (quoting United Dominion Indus., Inc. v. United States, 532 U.S. 822, 838 (2001)).
295 Estate of Petter v. Commissioner, 653 F.3d 1012 (9th Cir. 2011) (Bybee, J., writing
for the court).
296 Id. at 1023-24.
3232012]
Virginia Tax Review
be challenged. Mayo does not close off those avenues, indeed it widens
them in some instances.
It will be up to taxpayers' representatives to present the right
arguments to the courts. Mayo thus imposes a burden on the tax community
to sharpen awareness of general rules of administrative law. The payoff for
shouldering that burden, however, will be more effective client
representation and preservation of fairness and balance in tax
administration.
VII. CONCLUSION
In Mayo, the Supreme Court made important contributions to the
development of tax law and administrative law. They include bringing the
former firmly within the embrace of the latter insofar as regulations are
concerned and adding to the momentum for reform of Chevron.
These benefits are not eclipsed by the possibility of Mayo radically
altering the balance between taxpayers and the government in litigation
involving the validity of Treasury regulations. The possibility is raised, not
by Mayo alone, but by potential combinations of Mayo with other rules. But
this possibility can be minimized to an acceptable degree.
Mayo does take taxpayers out of an accustomed (yet ultimately
unpromising) mode of argument: the distorted factors-based conception of
National Muffler. But taxpayers have been given far more than what has
been taken away from them. Removed from their zone of illusory comfort,
taxpayers and their representatives will have to find other arguments. And
good arguments there are - better arguments than the caricatures of
National Muffler.
Numerous government victories in tax cases have later been used
against the Service by taxpayers. 297 A leading tax lawyer of his generation
remarked:
Reliable maxims do not abound in the tax field, but there are a
few. One relates to Moses' rod. It reminds us that every stick
crafted to beat on the head of a taxpayer will metamorphose sooner
or later into a large green snake and bite the commissioner on the
297 One prominent example is Crane v. Commissioner, 331 U.S. 1 (1947), which,
although ostensibly a government victory, "laid the foundation stone for most tax
shelters."Boris I. Bittker, Tax Shelters, Nonrecourse Debt, and the Crane Case, 33 TAX L.
REv. 277, 283 (1978); see also George K. Yin, The Story of Crane: How a Widow s
Misfortune Led to Tax Shelters, in TAx STORIES ch. 8 (Paul L. Caron ed., 2d ed. 2009).
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hind part.298
In the particular dispute, Mayo was a victory for the government.
However, if taxpayers make effective use of new arguments available to
them, Mayo may well become another case that bites the Service on the
posterior. In the long run, Mayo may provoke effective advocacy that leads
to more, not less, vigorous testing of arguably improper tax regulations.
298 Martin D. Ginsburg, Making Tax Law Through the Judicial Process, 70 A.B.A.J. 74,
76 (1984).
